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judicial decisions, diversity levels in the national
bench and bar have been an area of transnational
concern. By contrast, little is known about diversity of
adjudicators and counsel in international arbitration.
With a lack of accurate, complete, and publicly
available data about international arbitrators and
practitioners, speculation about membership in the
“invisible college” of international arbitration
abounds. Using data from a survey of attendees at the
prestigious and elite biennial Congress of the
International Council for Commercial Arbitration
permitted one glimpse into the membership of the
international arbitration community.
Although
defining the international arbitration community is
challenging, rather than leave the “invisible college”
unexamined, this Article offers one systematic glimpse
into the global elites of international arbitration using
data from 413 subjects who served as counsel and 262
who acted as arbitrators (including 67 investment
treaty arbitrators).
The median international
arbitrator was a fifty-three year old man who was a
national of a developed state reporting ten arbitral
appointments; and the median counsel was a forty-six
year old man who was a national of a developed state
and had served as counsel in fifteen arbitrations. In
addition: (1) 17.6% of the arbitrators were women,
and there was a significant age difference such that
male arbitrators were approximately ten years older
than women; (2) for those acting as international
arbitrators, we could not identify a significant
difference in the number of appointments women and
men obtained; (3) depending upon how development
status was defined, developing world arbitrators
accounted for fifteen to twenty percent of arbitrators;
and (4) for all measures used to analyze development
status, arbitrators from the developing world received
a statistically lower number of appointments than
their developed world counterparts. Recognizing the
data revealed diversity in international arbitration is
a complex phenomenon, the data nevertheless
supported, rather than disproved, claims that
international arbitration is a relatively homogenous
group. Acknowledging that international arbitration
may improve over time and diversity issues challenge
other forms of dispute resolution, diversity levels in

[53:429

2015] THE DIVERSITY CHALLENGE IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 431

international arbitration were somewhat lower than in
several national court systems but were generally
reflective of diversity levels in other international
courts and tribunals. The international arbitration
community seems aware of the distortions. For all
subjects, 57.5% either somewhat or strongly agreed
that international arbitration experiences challenges
related to gender, nationality, or age. Younger
subjects and women were statistically more likely to
identify such challenges as compared to older or male
subjects; but subjects from states outside the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) were less likely to identify
challenges when compared to their OECD
counterparts. Replication is necessary as the results
may reflect a limited historical baseline of
international arbitration global elites. Given the selfidentified concerns and the symbolic legitimacy of
broader representation, the international arbitration
community may wish to explore factors inhibiting full
utilization of untapped talent and facilitate aims of
procedural, and potentially distributive, justice.
Structural and incremental strategies could then
promote a sustainable international arbitration system
for the future.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1977, Oscar Schachter referred to “The Invisible College
of International Lawyers” to describe the elite professional
community of professors, students, government officials, civil
servants, and practitioners silently influencing international law.1 At
that moment in history, little was known about those involved in the
“Invisible College” of the global international arbitration community.
Since then, with the classic socio-legal study by Yves Dezalay and
Bryant Garth,2 tranches of discrete information published by arbitral
institutions and the recent work of some empirical scholars, we have
begun to uncover a degree of information about key actors in
international arbitration.
José Alvarez has described the
“democratization of the invisible college.”3 There is, however, still a
1. Oscar Schachter, The Invisible College of International Lawyers, 72 NW. U. L.
REV. 217, 217 (1977); see also DIANA CRANE, INVISIBLE COLLEGES: DIFFUSION OF
KNOWLEDGE IN SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITIES (1972).
2. YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER
(1996); see also DANIEL TERRIS ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL JUDGE: AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE MEN AND WOMEN WHO DECIDE THE WORLD’S CASES (2007) (conducting a similar
process to interview thirty international judges to offer a portrait of the public international
law judiciary); Thomas Schultz & Robert Kovacs, The Rise of a Third Generation of
Arbitrators? Fifteen Years After Dezalay and Garth, 28 ARB. INT’L 161 (2012) (updating
the scholarship of Dezalay & Garth); Maya Steinitz, Transnational Legal Process Theories,
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 339, 350–52 (Cesare P.R.
Romano et al. eds., 2013) (discussing the “invisible college” of international arbitration).
But see Catherine A. Rogers, Gulliver’s Troubled Travels, or the Conundrum of
Comparative Law, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 149, 153, 166–68 (1997) (identifying concerns
related to the methodology of Dezalay and Garth).
3. Jose E. Alvarez, The Democratization of the Invisible College, AM. SOC’Y INT’L L.
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dearth of empirical data that cuts across arbitration institutions and
subject matter to explore the identities of those involved in the
“invisible college” of international arbitration. To bring further
transparency to the “invisible college,” this Article addresses the gap
within the literature to offer demographic data about members of the
global community of international arbitration lawyers.4
The International Council for Commercial Arbitration (ICCA)
provided us with unprecedented access to their biennial Congress in
2014 to assess the international arbitration community empirically.
Our objective was to generate data using verifiable social science
methods to test others’ theories and our own assumptions with the
hope of improving international dispute settlement.

I.L. POST: PRESIDENT’S COLUMN (Nov. 8, 2007), available at http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/
default/files/ECM_PRO_065334.pdf; see also CATHERINE ROGERS, ETHICS IN
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (2014) (discussing the “invisible college” of international
arbitration); David Kennedy, The Politics of the Invisible College:
International
Governance and the Politics of Expertise, 5 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 463 (2001); Sergio
Puig, Social Capital in the Arbitration Marketplace, 25 EUR. J. INT’L L. 387 (2014)
(identifying a network effect among ICSID arbitrators).
4. Queen Mary University has worked with several partners, including White & Case
and PriceWaterhouseCoopers, to elucidate international arbitration through surveys and
interviews. See, e.g., PAUL FRIEDLAND & STAVROS BREKOULAKIS, WHITE & CASE AND
QUEEN MARY, UNIV. OF LONDON, 2012 INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION SURVEY: CURRENT
AND PREFERRED PRACTICES IN THE ARBITRAL PROCESS (2012),
http://annualreview
2012.whitecase.com/International_Arbitration_Survey_2012.pdf [hereinafter White &
Case/Queen Mary University of London Survey]; PAUL FRIEDLAND & LOUKAS MISTELIS,
WHITE & CASE AND QUEEN MARY, UNIV. OF LONDON, 2010 INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
SURVEY: CHOICES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (2010), http://www.whitecase.com/
files/upload/fileRepository/2010-International-Arbitration-Survey-Choices-InternationalArbitration.pdf; GERRY LAGERBERG & LOUKAS MISTELIS, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS &
QUEEN MARY, UNIV. OF LONDON, CORPORATE CHOICES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION:
INDUSTRY
PERSPECTIVES
(2013),
https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/arbitration-disputeresolution/assets/pwc-international-arbitration-study.pdf. Benjamin Davis has conducted
preliminary research related to diversity of international arbitrators within the United States.
See Benjamin G. Davis, American Diversity in International Arbitration 2003–2013 (PrePublication Draft) (Univ. of Toledo Research Studies, Paper No. 2014-03, 2013), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2364967. Recent research by Tom Stipanowich also provides
empirical perspectives on international arbitration, including aspects related to diversity. See
Thomas J. Stipanowich, Reflections on the State and Future of Commercial Arbitration:
Challenges, Opportunities, Proposals, 25 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. (forthcoming 2015),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2519084 (identifying
roughly fifteen percent of a sample of international arbitrators as women and exploring the
literature related to gender diversity in international arbitration); Thomas Stipanowich & J.
Ryan Lamare, Living with “ADR”: Evolving Perceptions and Use of Mediation, Arbitration
and Conflict Management in Fortune 1,000 Corporations, 19 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1
(2013) (conducting empirical research on international commercial arbitration).
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At the start of the 2014 ICCA Congress, Jan Paulsson argued
that internal reflection and debate should encourage the improvement
of international arbitration. Within two weeks of the Congress and
our experiment, V.V. Veeder asked the international arbitration
community “to act now to regulate itself or risk ‘reputational
disaster’”5 and encouraged the use of data to begin that process.6 The
twin observations from Veeder and Paulsson underscore the
importance of the research and the initial findings offered in this
Article.
Whereas historic divides in international arbitration mirrored
Cold War rifts between east and west,7 our data demonstrated that
two gaps within international arbitration involve development status
and gender. Recognizing that there are diversity challenges in
dispute resolution generally8 and that there have been arguable shifts
since Dezalay and Garth’s original scholarship,9 international
arbitration stands poised to engage in self-reflection and develop
strategies for the future.
This Article first examines the existing literature to identify
what was historically known about the “invisible college” of
international arbitration. Part II then provides the methodology and
explains the data collection procedures. Part III identifies core
subject demographics with a focus on the identity of arbitrators and
counsel. Parts IV and V then explore how subjects perceived their
own experiences with diversity and then contrast those assessments
against subjects’ actual experience. Part VI then considers the
normative implications for legitimacy. Part VII acknowledges the
limitations of the analyses. The Article concludes the data raise two
important questions, namely: what the appropriate baseline is for
examining the experiences of international arbitration and how the
arbitration community wishes to respond. Given the international
arbitration community’s acknowledgement of diversity concerns, it
would be constructive to identify factors impeding or preventing the
maximization of untapped arbitration talent. Recognizing the need to
5. Leo Szolnoki, London: Veeder Backs Paulsson’s Call to Self-Regulate, 9 GLOBAL
ARB. REV. (Mar. 27, 2014), available at http://globalarbitrationreview.com/journal/
article/32528/london-veeder-backs-paulssons-call-self-regulate.
6. Id.
7. V.V. Veeder, Remarks at the ICCA 50th Anniversary Banquet, 3 (May 19, 2011),
available at http://www.arbitration-icca.org/media/0/13087101785130/v.v._veeder_speach.
pdf.
8. See infra Part IV (exploring diversity challenges in national courts and
international tribunals).
9. DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 2.
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retain quality without unduly burdening party autonomy, there is
value in identifying diversity opportunities and capacity building to
promote justice-facilitating objectives and build a sustainable
international arbitration system for the future.
I. THE “INVISIBLE COLLEGE” OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
There is a lack of empirical evidence about the identity of
actors in international arbitration, particularly those who actually
serve or might serve as arbitrators.
Some websites and arbitration organizations offer a degree of
information about potential arbitrators.
For example, the
International Arbitration Institute10 and Arbitral Women11 have
websites where one can search through biographies of registered
arbitrators. Institutions like the American Arbitration Association’s
International Centre for Dispute Resolution (ICDR), the International
Chamber of Commerce (ICC), the London Court of International
Arbitration (LCIA), and the International Centre for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID) also maintain a general roster or
database of people willing to serve as international arbitrators.12
Other commercial services distribute lists of arbitration experts.13
Despite this general information on those who could theoretically
serve as arbitrators, there is no centralized public repository
providing information about individuals who have actually served as
10. See Search the IAI Directory, INT’L ARB. INST. PARIS, http://www.iaiparis.com/
drm_search.asp (last visited May 16, 2015).
11. See Find a Practitioner, ARBITRAL WOMEN, http://www.arbitralwomen.com/
index.aspx?sectionlinks_id=7&language=0&pageName=MemberSearch (last visited May
16, 2015).
12. Raymond G. Bender, Jr., Three Practical Steps to Avoid an Erroneous Arbitration,
30 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIGATION 155 (Int’l Inst. for Conflict Prevention &
Resolution, 2012).
13. For example, Who’s Who Legal has a yearly compendium of Commercial
Arbitration identifying the most highly regarded firms and individuals that requires
participants to be nominated by peers. Most Highly Regarded Firms: Commercial
Arbitration
2013,
WHO’S
WHO
LEGAL
(Nov.
2012),
available
at
http://whoswholegal.com/news/analysis/article/30104/most-highly-regarded-firmscommercial-arbitration-2013/. Chambers & Partners identifies firms—and individuals
within those firms—as having elite arbitration expertise and the Global Arbitration Review
generates an index identifying top entities. Nationwide: International Arbitration,
CHAMBERS & PARTNERS, available at http://www.chambersandpartners.com/12788/
738/editorial/5/1 (last visited May 16, 2015); GAR 100—7th Edition, GLOBAL ARB. R. (Jan.
1, 2014), available at http://globalarbitrationreview.com/surveys/survey/948/gar-100-7thedition.
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arbitrators that would permit one to identify and analyze core
demographic information about international arbitrators.14 Where
institutions have the internal capacity to gather and analyze the data
on their own arbitrators, their publicized data focus on basic
information about arbitrator nationality.
Beyond information
published in Chambers and Partners, Global Arbitration Review, or
the International Bar Association’s Who’s Who of Commercial
Arbitration,15 there is little information available on the background,
experience, and identities of the international arbitration bar. As
such, it is perhaps unsurprising that international arbitration functions
as a classic “invisible college.”
Given the lack of holistic information,16 identifying who acts
as counsel or arbitrator can only be assessed by considering major
international institutions on a case-by-case basis. This section
therefore reviews information about arbitrators from institutions
including the ICC,17 LCIA, Singapore International Arbitration
14. Catherine Rogers recommends providing publicly available information about
arbitrators, or what she refers to as “Arbitrator Intelligence.” Catherine A. Rogers & Alex
Wiker, Piloting Arbitrator Intelligence, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Apr. 10, 2014),
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/author/catherinerogers; see also Catherine A. Rogers,
Fit and Function in Legal Ethics: Developing a Code of Conduct for International
Arbitration, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 341 (2002); Catherine A. Rogers, Regulating International
Arbitrators: A Functional Approach to Developing Standards of Conduct, 41 STAN. J. INT’L
L. 53 (2005); Hans Smit, The Future of International Commercial Arbitration: A Single
Transnational Institution?, 25 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 9, 30–32 (1986). Professor Rogers
launched and, in January 2015, completed a pilot program to gather arbitrator information.
See ARBITRATOR INTELLIGENCE, http://www.arbitratorintelligence.org (last visited May 16,
2015).
15. See, e.g., Arbitrator Profiles, INVESTMENT ARB. REP., http://www.iareporter.com/
categories/profiles (last visted May 16, 2015); GAR 45 Under 45 2011-Introduction, 6
GLOBAL ARB. REV. (Aug. 11, 2011), available at http://globalarbitrationreview.com/
surveys/article/29699/%20gar45452011introduction; Michael Goldhaber, Arbitration
Scorecard 2013, AM. LAW. (June 24, 2013), http://www.americanlawyer.com/
id=1202608198051/ArbitrationScorecard2013?slreturn=20150225152802;
see
also
Sebastian Perry, Portrait of the Arbitrator, 9 GLOBAL ARB. REV. (May 6, 2014),
http://globalarbitrationreview.com/news/article/32586/portraitarbitrator;
Catherine
A.
Rogers, The Vocation of the International Arbitrator, 20 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 957 (2005).
16. Arbitral institutions may wish to collaborate in creating this type of information
and making it freely available to the public. See infra note 86 and accompanying text.
17. For another ICCA Congress session, the ICC reported that “[i]n 2002, there were
660 individuals from 62 countries fulfilling arbitral appointments in ICC arbitration, whereas
in 2012 the numbers increased to 847 individuals from 72 countries.” Draft Responses of
John Beechey, 2014 ICCA Congress Panel B-2 Questionnaire, Response to Question 2 (on
file with ICCA), available at http://www.arbitration-icca.org/conferences-and-congresses/
miamiprogramme.html. The ICC also noted some demographic shifts in party location and
places of arbitration over the past decade, stating that “whereas the percentage of parties
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Centre (SIAC), and ICSID and focuses on the nationality information
they have made available to the public.18 We are unaware of any
demographic information on counsel, whether based upon nationality
or otherwise, provided by arbitration institutions.
The LCIA reported that, in 2012, it had 265 new arbitrations.
Of those cases, 52.6% of arbitrators were purely nationals from the
United Kingdom.19 As the rate of U.K. arbitrators at the LCIA was
roughly sixty-one percent in 2005,20 descriptively, this decrease in
from Africa, Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe, and South East Asia increased
from 38.3% to 46.9% between 2003 and 2012 (i.e., a 22% increase), the percentage of places
of arbitration located in those regions within the same period increased from 15.6% to 25.3%
(i.e., a 62% increase).” Id. at Response to Question 1.
18. We were unable to locate demographic data on the websites or elsewhere for the
ICDR, but parties can pay US$750 for a list of five potential arbitrators. Arbitrator and
Mediator Selection, AM. ARB. ASS’N, https://www.adr.org/aaa/faces/arbitratorsmediators/
arbitratormediatorselection?_afrLoop=1497714073611632&_afrWindowMode=0&_afrWin
dowId=12kiedkwei_1#%40%3F_afrWindowId%3D12kiedkwei_1%26_afrLoop%3D149771
4073611632%26_afrWindowMode%3D0%26_adf.ctrl-state%3D12kiedkwei_55 (last visited
May 16, 2015). We were unable to locate arbitrator information from other institutions
including the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre, the Kigali International
Arbitration Centre, the Australian Centre for International Commercial Arbitration, the
Center for Arbitration and Mediation of the Chamber of Commerce Brazil-Canada, or the
Dubai International Arbitration Centre. There is some data suggesting that the China
International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC) keeps track of the
nationality of arbitrators, primarily by virtue of a listing process, albeit with mixed success
in achieving diversity and results. Compare Jonathan H. Zimmerman, When Dealing with
Chinese Entities, Avoid the CIETAC Arbitration Process, 53 ADVOC. 23, 23 (Idaho State
Bar, 2010) (“CIETAC has been in existence since 1956, and boast [sic] that it has 274
foreign arbitrators (not Chinese Nationals) of its 969 listed arbitrators. Even with the foreign
arbitrators, this method of arbitration is [sic] disagreeable prospect with foreign or North
American companies; especially if you have experienced it.”), with Sarah R. MacLean,
CIETAC, From Underdog to Role Model: Bringing the ICC Back to the Forefront in the
Field of International Arbitration, 16 GONZ. J. INT’L L. 62, 72-73 (2012) (observing that
CIETAC chairs are primarily Chinese nationals, U.S. parties’ win rates are roughly equal to
cases lost and outcomes for parties involving other states—like Germany and Australia—has
been fairly similar).
19. See
LCIA,
REGISTRAR’S
REPORT
4
(2012),
available
at
http://www.lcia.org/LCIA/reports.aspx (observing that for the 344 total appointments in
2012, 181 were exclusively U.K. nationals, and that of those, parties appointed 84, the LCIA
Court appointed 73 and co-arbitrators appointed 24; the remaining 144 appointments were
“Australian; Austrian; Bahraini; Bangladeshi; Belgian; Brazilian; Canadian; Colombian;
Czech; Dutch; Egyptian; French; German; Greek; Indian; Irish; Lebanese; Maltese; New
Zealand; Nigerian; Peruvian; Portuguese; Russian; Singaporean; South African; Swedish;
Swiss; and U.S.,” but nineteen 19 were U.K. dual nationals, which means that 200
appointees were U.K. nationals or dual nationals for a total U.K. appointment rate of 58.1%).
20. See LCIA, DIRECTOR GENERAL’S REVIEW OF 2005 at 3 (2005), available at
http://www.lcia.org/LCIA/reports.aspx (observing that 57 arbitrators appointed by the
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the proportion of British appointees may reflect the need for
additional arbitrators given the LCIA’s 220% increase in
appointments.21 Even more recently, more than half of LCIA
arbitrators were U.K. nationals.22
Other institutions also have a tendency to derive more than
half of their arbitrators from the country where the institution is
located. SIAC’s 2013 annual report, for example, indicated that out
of fifty-six new international arbitrations, around fifty-one percent of
arbitrators were Singapore nationals, and approximately twenty
percent of arbitrators were from the United Kingdom.23 India and
Malaysia also had prominent representation at SIAC, with slightly
less than twenty percent of appointments, demonstrating a degree of
national diversity.24
ICSID, which has jurisdiction over cases arising under certain
commercial contracts, national investment law, and investment
treaties, publishes a biannual summary of ICSID tribunals and ad hoc
committees. By the end of 2013, there were 459 registered cases.
ICSID provides information by region and country.
ICSID
arbitrators, conciliators, and ad hoc committee members came from
seventy-seven different states; forty-nine percent were European
nationals, twenty-two percent were from North America, thirteen
percent were from Central or South America, ten percent were from
Asia or the Pacific, and six percent were from Africa or the Middle
East.25 The most frequently appointed nationalities were the United
parties were U.K. nationals, 36 nominated by the LCIA court were U.K. nationals, which
means 93 of the 152 total appointments were U.K. nationals but failing to comment on the
presence of dual nationals).
21. Compare LCIA REVIEW, supra note 20, at 3 (reflecting that the number of
appointments in 2005 was 152), with LCIA REPORT, supra note 19, at 4 (reflecting that the
number of appointments in 2012 was 344, an increase of 220% from 2005).
22. But see LCIA REVIEW, supra note 20, at 3 (suggesting that “a higher percentage of
party nominees than of LCIA Court nominees are of English nationality” means that “any
English ‘bias’ in the nationality of arbitrators has very much to do with the pragmatic
selection of arbitrators qualified in the most-commonly-applicable law(s) and nothing to do
with the English origins of the institution”).
23. SING. INT’L ARB. CENTRE, ANNUAL REPORT 2013 (2013), http://www.siac.org.sg/
images/stories/articles/annual_report/SIAC_Annual_Report_2013.pdf. These numbers were
roughly stable over time. See Resources, SING. INT’L ARB. CENTRE, http://www.siac.org.sg/
2013-09-18-01-57-20/2013-09-22-00-27-02/annual-report (last visited May 16, 2015)
(provides prior annual reports).
24. ANNUAL REPORT 2013, supra note 23.
25. INT’L CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT INVESTMENT DISPS. (ICSID), THE ICSID
CASELOAD—STATISTICS (ISSUE 2014–1) 18 (2014), https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/
ICSIDWEB/ resources/Documents/2014-1%20English.pdf [hereinafter 2014-1 STATISTICS].
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States (163 appointments), France (155), the United Kingdom (133),
Canada (97), Switzerland (93), Spain (52), and Australia (50).26
Waibel and Wu also identified the dominance of developed country
arbitrators at ICSID. Specifically, for the 341 ICSID arbitrators
sitting between 1978 and 2011, they identified sixty-six percent of
ICSID arbitrators as nationals of OECD states.27
In investment treaty arbitration (ITA), scholars have begun
identifying arbitrator demographics. A study of 102 ITA arbitration
awards rendered before 2007 identified a pool of 145 ITA arbitrators:
of that group, 75% were from OECD states and 3.5% percent were
women.28 Expanded research from 252 ITA awards rendered by
January 2012 identified a pool of 247 different arbitrators wherein
80.6% were from OECD states and 3.6% were women. Given
repeated appointments of certain female arbitrators, at least one
woman was present in 18.3% of the ITA awards. Tribunals
exclusively containing men constituted the majority (81.7%) of
awards.29 Other research replicates the general lack of female
arbitrators in ITA,30 and Rubins and Sinclair suggested in 2006 that,
26. Id. at 20; see also Noah Rubins & Anthony Sinclair, ICSID Arbitrators: Is There a
Club and Who Gets Invited?, 1 GLOBAL ARB. REV. (Nov. 1, 2006), available at
http://globalarbitrationreview.com/journal/article/16468/icsid-arbitrators-club-gets-invited
(exploring the nationality of ICSID arbitrators with pre-2007 data, identifying 279
individuals from 57 different countries who have served as arbitrators, with nationals from
the United States having the largest number of appointments, followed by French, British,
Swiss, and Canadian nationals, but observing several Mexican arbitrators were appointed).
27. Michael Waibel & Yanhui Wu, Are Arbitrators Political?, 27–41 (Dec. 2011)
(working paper) (on file with authors), available at http://www.wipol.unibonn.de/lehrveranstaltungen-1/lawecon-workshop/archive/dateien/waibelwinter11-12; see
also Puig, supra note 3, at 401 (discussing Waibel & Wu, supra note 27, and the
underrepresentation of developing countries in the arbitration community).
28. Susan D. Franck, Empirically Evaluating Claims about Investment Treaty
Arbitration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1, 75−82 (2007) [hereinafter Franck, Empirically Evaluating];
see also Susan D. Franck, Development and Outcomes in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 50
HARV. INT’L L.J. 438, 459 (2009) [hereinafter Franck, Development and Outcomes] (noting
that, using World Bank classifications for development status, in the pool of presiding
arbitrators generating final awards, seventy-four percent were from high income states,
seventeen percent were from upper-middle income states, eleven percent were from lowermiddle income states, and there were no presiding arbitrators from low income states).
29. SUSAN D. FRANCK, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION: MYTHS, REALITIES
COSTS (forthcoming).

AND

30. Research conducted by Waibel and Wu identified that ninety-five percent of their
sample was male and five percent was female. Wabiel & Wu, supra note 27, at 27; see also
Lucy Greenwood & C. Mark Baker, Getting a Better Balance on International Arbitration
Tribunals, 28 ARB. INT’L 653, 656, 663−65 (2012) (analyzing ICSID cases to identify that
5.6% of all arbitrator appointments were women and suggesting that approximately 6% of
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“data supports the view that ICSID belongs primarily to
gentlemen.”31
II. THE DATA AND METHODOLOGY
At the outset, we note that this was first generation research
from the first dataset of its kind. We are unaware of anyone else ever
having performed a live data-collection exercise on international
arbitrators to collect holistic demographic information. Although
there is some data on the “invisible college” available for ITA, there
is minimal research on international commercial arbitration (ICA),
which makes this data unique.
Our survey materials included survey questions exploring
conference themes of precision and justice and requesting
demographic information.32 This Article focuses on demographics of
the international arbitration community related to: (1) gender; (2)
nationality; (3) age; (4) linguistic capacity; (5) legal training; and (6)
professional experiences related to arbitration. We also asked
targeted questions related to diversity within international
arbitration.33
Our objective was to target the population of international
arbitration practitioners and arbitrators. We acknowledge that
precisely capturing the “international arbitration community” is
challenging; there is no uniform definition and the community
ICA tribunals contained a woman); Gus Van Harten, The (Lack of) Women Arbitrators in
Investment Treaty Arbitration, COLUM. FDI PERSPS. NO. 59 (Feb. 6, 2012),
http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2014/01/FDI_59.pdf (observing that in 631 appointments in
249 known ITA cases, only 41 of appointments, namely 6.5%, were women). Gender
diversity in private international commercial arbitration may be greater than in ITA. See
Stipanowich, supra note 4, at 56−57 (identifying that in a sample of international arbitrators,
roughly fifteen percent were women and exploring the literature related to gender diversity
in international arbitration).
31. Rubins & Sinclair, supra note 26.
32. See Susan D. Franck et al., International Arbitration: Demographics, Precision
and Justice, in INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL FOR COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, LEGITIMACY:
MYTHS, REALITIES, CHALLENGES, ICCA Congress Series No. 18, at 33–122 (Albert Jan Van
Den Berg ed., 2015) (exploring issues related to precision—including advance articulation
of the burden of proof, whether burdens of proof are outcome determinative, advance
articulation of cost-shifting standards, document withholding, and tribunal preparation—as
well as issues related to justice—including arbitrator incentives related to the prestige of
arbitration, future interaction with co-arbitrators, consideration of future appointments, and
fraud) [hereinafter ICCA MIAMI CONGRESS PROCEEDINGS].
33. See infra Annex 1.
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changes as people enter and exit the profession, people age, and cores
of the community are in motion.34 In order to tap the population of
interest, our sampling frame was the group of 1,031 ICCA
registrants.35
ICCA is a prestigious non-governmental organization
representing the international arbitration bar. ICCA’s governing
board includes some of the most prominent arbitrators in ICA and
ITA, the secretary general of ICSID, two past presidents of the
American Society of International Law, the Principal Legal Counsel
for the Government of Mexico in negotiating NAFTA, the General
Counsel of ExxonMobil, the Attorney General of Kenya, a former
Attorney General of Pakistan, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
of Singapore, the chair of the Hong Kong International Arbitration
Centre, the director of the Cairo Regional Centre for International
Commercial Arbitration, and authors of several of the most important
international arbitration treatises.36 Our assessment was that ICCA is
an important group in the international arbitration community. As
such, the biennial ICCA Congress is a critical event that international
arbitration counsel and arbitrators will attend.
While we
acknowledge the risk of a selection effect, we nevertheless believe
that ICCA and our data provide a representative sample of the
international arbitration community and international arbitrators. The
ICCA Congress is an elite “must go” event of the international
arbitration community that is attended by influential members of that
community.37 The Congress has several advantages: A historical
34. See DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 2, at 12, 28, 61, 117, 157, 242, 248, 296
(discussing certain cores in international arbitration and the intersection spheres of related
spheres); see also Rogers, supra note 2, at 167 (discussing the “core” of the international
arbitration community).
35. Twelve of the registrants worked on the research team, and two people had
reviewed earlier drafts of the material during beta-testing. As such, only 1,017 of the
registrants were capable of answering the survey. This also meant that, out of the potential
subjects, we obtained a 54.3% response rate. This was a reasonable response rate given
similar previous studies. See Edward K. Cheng, Independent Judicial Research in the
Daubert Age, 56 DUKE L.J. 1263, 1278 (2007) (indicating that a response rate of
approximately 61% of subjects in a judicial conference is “quite reasonable”).
36. ICCA also prepares numerous arbitration publications with the help of the
Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague, including the Yearbook Commercial
Arbitration and the International Handbook on Commercial Arbitration. See generally
ICCA Governing Board, INT’L COUNCIL FOR COM. ARB., http://www.arbitrationicca.org/about/governing-board.html (last visited May 16, 2015); International Council for
Commercial Arbitration, INT’L COUNCIL FOR COM. ARB., (last visited May 16, 2015). ICCA
is not affiliated with the research team, and none of the authors are ICCA members.
37. See, e.g., DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 2, at 20 (discussing ICCA’s elite and
influential nature in connection with the “grand old men” of international arbitration); see
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pedigree, substantive content exploring transnational legal
innovations in arbitration, scarcity of programming (i.e. only every
other year), and a transnational approach.38 Assessing ICCA
attendees therefore provides a singular opportunity to do “one-stopshopping” for data collection on international arbitration. This high
value was, in large part, why we selected the ICCA Congress as the
forum for our research. Moreover, this methodological approach is
standard, as it has similarly been used to conduct research on judges
by way of providing surveys to judges at judicial conferences.39
During the first plenary session, all ICCA Congress
registrants in attendance were offered a voluntary opportunity to
complete a survey confidentially. While inevitably people who
registered did not attend the conference or the initial plenary due to
personal constraints or work obligations, our assessment was that if
registrants were able to attend the first ICCA Plenary, they did so.40
Upon delivering the materials to all subjects, 552 people completed
the survey. After excluding responses of four subjects who asked
that their responses not be used for published research, the sample
contained 548 individuals (the “ICCA subjects”).41
After receiving the materials, subjects had approximately
thirty-five minutes to complete all of the materials, and while they
completed the materials we observed them focused on responding.
While most subjects completed nearly all of the survey, given the
voluntary nature, not all ICCA subjects completed all questions.42
also infra note 53 and accompanying text (identifying that a selection effect incentivizing
elite arbitration specialists to attend ICCA rather than newer entrants to the arbitration
marketplace may limit inferences from the data).
38. See generally Veeder, supra note 7 (discussing the historical pedigree and unique
nature of ICCA); see also infra note 53 and accompanying text.
39. See, e.g., Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases,
93 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2007); Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L.
REV. 777 (2001); Chris Guthrie et al., The “Hidden Judiciary”: An Empirical Examination
of Executive Branch Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 1477 (2009). We acknowledge the possibility of
differences between conferences comprised wholly of U.S. judges and a conference where
individuals must self-report arbitrator experience. For limitations to our survey, see infra
Part VII. Nonetheless, we believe that our methodology reliably tested known arbitrators,
see infra note 43.
40. ICCA Congress organizers also confirmed that, historically, the first plenary
session is the most well-attended ICCA session.
41. Given the demographic information of the four subjects, which we promised not to
reveal, their contributions form no part in the analyses of these sections and the small size
has a de minimis effect.
42. All ICCA subjects returned the survey before leaving the plenary session; ten
subjects returned blank surveys with all questions unanswered. This means, for individuals
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For those who completed the materials, we distinguish types of
information provided. For example, we provide information on the
demographics of all ICCA subjects broken down by type of
experience in international arbitration. Next, when we focus on
arbitrators, we demarcate between groups of individuals who have
served as an arbitrator and also focus on subsets of individuals with
specific experience in ICA or ITA. Similarly, we distinguish
between response patterns for: (1) all ICCA subjects answering the
relevant question(s); (2) the subset of subjects responding that they
had acted as an international arbitrator; and (3) the subset of subjects
indicating that they served as counsel in international arbitration.43
We observed that many international arbitrators (including
arbitrators with multiple appointments) completed the survey.44
Although our survey did not reach one hundred percent of the
population of known ITA arbitrators, there were responses from
sixty-seven ITA arbitrators, which represented a healthy proportion
(twenty-seven percent) of arbitrators identified in Franck’s research
on ITA awards.45
Inferences drawn from the data are only as strong as the
representativeness of the sample from which the data derive.46
Although limitations will be discussed in Part VII, it is appropriate to
acknowledge that, should the registrants of ICCA Miami 2014 and
those subjects completing the survey not reflect the larger

at the first plenary, 98.2% answered at least one question.
43. It is possible that there may be a response bias generated from subjects who failed
to answer all questions. While we cannot eliminate the risk of response bias, the large
number of subjects who did respond to the vast majority of questions (and the small number
of subjects who failed to answer) attests to the underlying validity of the gathered data.
Nevertheless, replication is necessary to decrease the risk of error.
44. Of the 1,017 ICCA registrants capable of participating in the survey, there is
publicly available documentation confirming that 496 registrants have served as
international arbitrators. See supra note 35. As 262 subjects expressly identified themselves
as arbitrators, at a minimum, our subjects reflected at least 52.8% of the arbitrators attending
ICCA. But see infra Part VII for limitations to this conclusion. Given conference fees and
others costs mentioned above, it is possible that we only sampled affluent senior counsel.
The broader population of counsel in international arbitration may be meaningfully different.
See, e.g., supra note 37 and accompanying text.
45. See generally FRANCK, supra note 29 (coding arbitrators on tribunals rendering
public awards); see also Puig, supra note 3, at 403 (coding arbitrator appointments at ICSID
from its inception, including both ICA and ITA cases, and identifying 419 different
arbitrators receiving appointments).
46. All data was coded twice, and there was a ninety-seven percent inter-coder
reliability rate. Final codes were made after consulting the raw materials.
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international arbitration community, the value of the inferences in
this Article decreases.
Selection effects may impact the results. First, as the
conference was in Miami, it is possible that subjects from the United
States or North America were over-represented. This generates the
possibility that the data were systematically skewed. Second, it is
possible that arbitration experts from non-North American countries
were under-represented.47 Although there was a high concentration
of western European subjects, other countries that have active
international arbitration centers experienced low representation at
ICCA. For example, the China International Economic and Trade
Arbitration Commission (CIETAC) reports that it has a heavy
international arbitration caseload;48 yet, there were relatively few
attendees from China.49 To address those twin concerns and evaluate
the value of the baseline descriptive data, the demographic data
collection should be replicated over time in other venues and as
ICCA Congresses rotate among international venues. Forthcoming
Congresses in Mauritius and Sydney, for example, provide the
opportunity to reassess differences at geographical venues that are
proximate to continents with the two largest global populations and
presumably have large needs for international arbitration services.
Third, as the ICCA proceedings were conducted in English,50 it is
47. Under-representation could derive from the need to secure a visa. Only thirty-eight
countries qualify for the Visa Waiver program, which eliminates the need for an advance
visa for U.S. visitors. Visa Waiver Program, U.S. VISAS: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
http://travel.state.gov/content/visas/english/visit/visa-waiver-program.html (last visited May
16, 2015). The location of ICCA Congress is known four years in advance, and ICCA had
information on its website expressly devoted to U.S. entry issues and supported participants
by providing letters of invitation in support of visas. Congress Information: US Visa Waiver
Program (VWP), INT’L COUNCIL FOR COM. ARB., http://www.iccamiami2014.com/
#USEntry;
Registration
Form,
INT’L
COUNCIL
FOR
COM.
ARB.,
http://www.iccamiami2014.com. This decreases, but cannot eliminate, potential distortions
from visa-related issues.
48. Chi Manjiao, Drinking Poison to Quench Thirst: The Discriminatory Arbitral
Award Enforcement Regime under Chinese Arbitration Law, 39 H.K. L.J. 541, 557−59
(2009); Alexander Zesch, CIETAC’s New Rules: A View through the Critics’ Lens, 16
VINDOBONA J. INT’L COM. L. & ARB. 283 (2012).
49. We observe that, even though the most recent ICCA Congress was in Singapore,
there were few participants from Singapore.
50. English has become the dominant language of international arbitration. Roger P.
Alford, The American Influence on International Arbitration, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL.
69, 86 (2003) (“English has become the lingua franca of international arbitration. One
prominent arbitrator, Jan Paulsson, recently noted . . . that ‘[t]en years ago, half my cases
were in French and half in English. Now, it’s ninety percent English.’”); Stephan W. Schill,
W(h)ither Fragmentation? On the Literature and Sociology of International Investment
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possible that those whose mother tongue is not English (particularly
arbitration specialists speaking Chinese, Spanish, Hindi, Arabic,
Japanese, and French,51 which are among the most prevalent
languages on the planet) were also under-represented.52 Fourth, it is
possible that ICCA attendees were older and more elite international
arbitration participants.
Newer entrants to the international
arbitration marketplace may have greater opportunity costs, with less
immediate returns, to attending ICCA and the data may therefore
under-represent newer or non-elite arbitration specialists.53 Fifth, to
the extent that ICCA is a relatively expensive conference—in terms
of the conference fee,54 flight, hotel, and opportunity costs of being
away from work—it is possible that some economically
disadvantaged specialists were systematically underrepresented.
We acknowledge the limitations that derive from the
representativeness of our sampling frame and the data sample. We
nevertheless believe that this first generation research provides a
valuable historical baseline for future researchers and offers a
Law, 22 EUR. J. INT’L L. 875, 887 (2011) (“As was the case with most investment treaty
arbitrations, English became the lingua franca of international investment law.”). It is
possible that a conference conducted in English does not generate a large selection effect as
those without English language skills may not be actively engaged in international
arbitration. Yet there are regional areas where international arbitration specialists may share
a common non-English language.
51. The African continent has the most French speakers in the world. French is also
the second most common language in Africa with approximately 120 million speakers.
ORGANISATION INTERNATIONALE DE LA FRANCOPHONIE, LA FRANCOPHONIE DANS LE MONDE
2006−2007 (2007).
52. ICCA recognizes the need for greater linguistic options at its Congresses and says
that it is likely to have simultaneous translation in French, English, and Portuguese at its
2016 Mauritius Congress. Salim Moollan, Invitation to ICCA Mauritius 2016, INT’L
COUNCIL FOR COM. ARB., at 7:24–35, http://www.arbitration-icca.org/AV_Library/ICCA_
Mauritius_2016_by_Salim_Moollan.html (last visited May 16, 2015).
53. International arbitration is sometimes perceived as a club. Daphna Kapeliuk, The
Repeat Appointment Factor: Exploring Decision Patterns of Elite Investment Arbitrators,
96 CORNELL L. REV. 47 (2010); Puig, supra note 3. ICCA historically had barriers to entry.
As such, newer, non-elite arbitration specialists may hesitate to attend ICCA. Newer
entrants may be more likely to attend local, regional, or international conferences,
particularly if conducted in their native language and in a nearby location at low cost.
Analyzing the international arbitration community at ICCA Miami was an initial effort to
identify easily observable experts, but there are untapped aspects of the “invisible college.”
We hope that this initial data collection process is expanded to consider other core groups to
gather a more complete picture of the international arbitration community.
54. Recognizing the costs of ICCA’s Mauritius Congress in 2016, participants from
Africa will receive a fifty percent discount on their conference fees. See Moollan, supra
note 52, at 7:16–22.
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foundation for others to conduct research on international arbitration
counsel and arbitrators.
III. THE DEMOGRAPHICS OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
This Part presents the demographic characteristics of all
ICCA subjects completing the survey. It first identifies subjects’
professional experiences in international arbitration and dispute
settlement. Next, it focuses exclusively on international arbitrators
for variations in appointment levels by type of international
arbitration. It then provides breakdowns of subjects’ gender, age,
legal training, languages, and nationality. Using subject nationality
as a baseline, it also identifies how subjects’ home states ranked on
the development divide using three different measures to assess
development status. Finally, it synthesizes those findings and
identifies the data supporting the narrative of a relatively
homogenous group of actors in international arbitration.
A. Experience Related to International Arbitration

As a preliminary matter, we first identify the professional
experiences of the surveyed subjects. These demographics provide
basic information to ICCA and other arbitration organizations about
opportunities for strategic outreach.
Overall, the data reflected that ICCA subjects tended to have
experience either as counsel, some service as an international
arbitrator (whether ICA or ITA), or a combination of those
professional experiences. Table 1 indicates that most subjects were
involved as counsel in one or more international arbitrations (87%).
For each subject serving as counsel, they were involved in an average
of 27 cases (median=15). These figures contradict claims that there
are only between 100−200 practitioners worldwide with repeat
appointments in international arbitration.55 International arbitrators
were also prominent, with 60.4% of responding ICCA subjects
indicating they had acted as arbitrator in at least one case.
Subsection III(B) discusses the frequency of arbitral appointments in
greater detail.56
55. Christian Bühring-Uhle et al., The Arbitrator as Mediator: Some Recent Empirical
Insights, 20 J. INT’L ARB. 81, 81–82 (2003). There may be variation in counsel roles as, in
complex cases, global law firms may employ “local counsel” to handle domestic law issues
without relinquishing control of case strategy.
56. We recognize that the broader ICCA membership may contain more international
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Experts in international arbitration were moderately well
represented. Although it is not clear how many experts there are in
international arbitration globally, our data indicated that one-third of
ICCA subjects had served as an expert in at least one arbitration case.
The experts at ICCA, however, were not heavy repeat players. Table
1 indicates both measures of central tendency suggested a low
number of cases, with a mean of 3.6 and a median of 2.

arbitrators, and more international arbitrators were registered for the conference than
participated in the survey. For the purposes of this Article, references to ICCA arbitrators
(or the subset of ICCA arbitrators) incorporate this limitation.
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Table 1: Descriptive Data Identifying Frequency of Subjects’ Professional
Experience in International Arbitration for all ICCA Subjects57 and the Mean,
Median, and Maximum Number of Cases for ICCA Subjects with a Minimum
of One Case in a Category of Professional Experience
Categories of
Professional
Experience in
Arbitration58
Subjects
Acting as
Arbitration
Counsel

Percentage
of Subjects
(number of
responses)
87.3%
(n=413)

Mean
Number of
Cases

Median
Number of
Cases

Maximum
Number of
Cases

Standard
Deviation

27.3

15

501

46.9

All
International
Arbitrators

60.4%
(n=262)

34.6

10

501

64.6

Expert

32.3%
(n=126)

3.6

2

51

6.4

Judge in
National
Court

9.3%
(n=35)

571.3

51

10,001

1,740.7

Adjudicator
in Public
International
Law Dispute

4.6%
(n=17)

27.8

2

301

76.4

57. Some ICCA subjects failed to provide information on professional experiences.
This may reflect their lack of experience or that the data underrepresents subjects’ actual
experience. Subjects failing to answer were therefore omitted from the percentage
calculations. Of the 448 subjects analyzed, the following subjects expressly provided
information about their appointments (or lack thereof): (1) counsel = 473 responses (75
missing); (2) expert = 390 responses (158 missing); (3) ICA arbitrators = 432 responses (116
missing); (4) ITA arbitrators = 386 responses (162 missing); (5) public international law
adjudicators = 368 responses (180 missing); (6) judges = 376 responses (172 missing).
58. We based these categories on gateway experiences to international arbitration. We
did not focus on employees of institutions or tribunal secretaries as these individuals do not
technically adjudicate the disputes. Nevertheless, we acknowledge that tribunal secretaries
can play a critical part in the process. See Constantine Partasides, The Fourth Arbitrator?
The Role of Secretaries to Tribunals in International Arbitration, 18 ARB. INT’L 147 (2002).
Two subjects expressly identified themselves as tribunal secretaries. Although we did not
code those appointments as arbitrators, it suggests future research might usefully explore the
effect of tribunal secretaries. Given methodological and timing constraints, we did not code
for information about participants or others with experience in academia, non-governmental
organizations, policy think tanks, or unions. Future research might also explore
representation of these groups.
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There were at least two groups, however, with minimal
representation at ICCA. First, few ICCA subjects had been judges in
national courts. Table 1 indicates this was less than ten percent of
subjects. The wide standard deviation, however, reflects variation in
subject responses; while one set of subjects had extensive
appointments, another set of subjects reported smaller appointment
levels. Consequently, for the 35 individuals who had acted as judges,
the mean number of proceedings was 571.3 but the median was 51.
Second, independent of those subjects serving as ITA arbitrators,
there were few subjects with experience adjudicating public
international law disputes.59 Only 17 subjects (or 4.6% of those
responding) had served on at least one public international law
proceeding. Of those subjects, there was a variation in relative levels
of experience with subjects having an average of 27.8 cases and a
median of 2 cases. This low level of representation may, however,
reflect the small pool of public international adjudicators, such as the
small number of adjudicators at institutions like the International
Court of Justice or World Trade Organization.60
B. Experience as International Arbitrators

One critical question involved how frequently arbitrators
exercised their adjudicative functions.61 Our survey asked subjects to
report how many times they had served as an ICA arbitrator, and it
separately asked how many times they served as an ITA arbitrator.
Overall, as Table 1 reflects, 262 of our subjects (or a little less than
half) served as an arbitrator in at least one case.
Table 2 reflects that, overall, ICCA subjects who acted as
arbitrators were involved in an average of 34.6 cases and the
statistically “median arbitrator” arbitrated 10 cases. The variation

59. The survey and the data analysis differentiated between “public international law”
and ITA cases. Subjects were therefore able to distinguish between traditional public
international law cases and other types of international dispute settlement.
60. See, e.g., Shashank Kumar & Cecily Rose, A Study of Lawyers Appearing Before
the International Court of Justice 1999−2012, 25 EUR. J. INT’L L. 893, 917 (2014); see also
José Augusto Fontoura Costa, Comparing WTO Panelists and ICSID Arbitrators: The
Creation of International Legal Fields, 1 OÑATI SOCIO-LEGAL SERIES 1, 3 (2011) (discussing
pools of arbitrators involved in international trade and ICSID disputes).
61. See Kapeliuk, supra note 53, at 72−74 (defining “elite” ITA arbitrators as those
who have served on four or more cases); see also James Clasper, London’s Elite Arbitration
Groups, 1 GLOBAL ARB. REV. (Apr. 1, 2006) (exploring elite arbitration practices, and
arbitrators, in London), available at http://globalarbitrationreview.com/journal/article/
18197/londons-elite-arbitration-groups.
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between those two measures of central tendency was driven by a
small number of arbitrators arbitrating a large number of cases. 25
subjects sat on more than 100 arbitrations (whether ICA or ITA
based), 12 subjects sat on more than 200 cases, and one arbitrator
self-reported arbitrating more than 500 cases. Quartile breakdowns
offer insight into how frequently people sit as arbitrators. Super-elite
arbitrators in the top quartile arbitrated more than forty cases. Elite
arbitrators in the second highest quartile arbitrated between eleven
and forty cases. Experienced arbitrators, with relatively less
experience, were in the second lowest quartile and arbitrated between
four and ten cases. The least experienced arbitrators in the bottom
quartile arbitrated only one to three cases.62
Table 2: Descriptive Data of the Frequency of Cases for All ICCA Subjects
Reporting Service as an Arbitrator in at Least One Case and Subsets of ICA
and ITA Arbitrators
All
Arbitrators

ICA
Arbitrators

34.6

33.2

6.6

3
10
40

3
10
30

1
2
6

Maximum Appointments

501

501

60

Standard Deviation

64.6

63.0

11.6

Total Number of Subjects

262

260

67

Mean Number of Arbitration
Cases
Appointment Quartiles
1st quartile (25th percentile)
2nd quartile (median)
3rd quartile (75th percentile)

ITA
Arbitrators

While the data demonstrated that elite arbitrators had more
appointments than others, the number of ICCA subjects with repeated
arbitrator experience reflects that the arbitrator bench was not
necessarily as narrow as one might perceive.63 Acknowledging that
62. See Table 2.
63. See DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 2, at 34−41 (claiming that “key source of
conflict” in international arbitration practice is the influx of newcomers); see also Catherine
A. Rogers, The Vocation of the International Arbitrator, 20 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 957, 968
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this may be a by-product of ICCA’s elite nature, these findings
should be re-evaluated in other contexts.
Table 2 reflects that the general patterns for all arbitrators
mirrors ICA arbitrators. There was a somewhat different facial
pattern for ITA arbitrators. More than half of ITA arbitrators had
served in only one to two ITA cases. Super-elite ITA arbitrators (i.e.
those in the top quartile of appointments) had six or more cases.
These figures for ITA may, however, reflect the recent and small ITA
caseload.
We would be remiss, however, to avoid focusing on one
intriguing finding. For the sixty-seven ITA arbitrators, only two of
those subjects identified that they had not also served as ICA
arbitrators. Put differently, only two ITA arbitrators had never
served on an ICA case. This provides evidence that serving as an
ICA arbitrator may be a “gateway” experience or pre-requisite for
serving as an ITA arbitrator.64 Nevertheless, it is not conclusive that
all ITA arbitrators must initially serve as ICA arbitrators, as there
may be other pathways to ITA appointments. Alternatively, the data
could reflect that being appointed in ITA expands ICA appointment
opportunities.
C. Gender, Age, Legal Training, Native Language, and Nationality of
International Arbitrators and Counsel

Existing literature on arbitrators has provided some
information on arbitrator background, usually from information
released from individual institutions or specific subject matter.
While difficult to prove a negative, we are unaware of any existing
research that systematically explores the gender, age, and nationality
of international arbitrators across institutions and subject matter.65
(2005) (observing the “market for international arbitrators operates as a relatively closed
system that is difficult for newcomers to penetrate”).
64. This supports Anthea Robert’s hypothesis that there is a public and private
international law divide within ITA. Anthea Roberts, Clash of Paradigms: Actors and
Analogies Shaping the Investment Treaty System, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 45 (2013); see also
Bruno Simma, Foreign Investment Arbitration: A Place for Human Rights?, 60 INT’L &
COMP. L. Q. 573 (2011).
65. There is an emerging literature related to ITA arbitrators. See supra notes 28−30.
Given ICSID’s jurisdictional mandate, research on ICSID arbitrators combines ICA and ITA
arbitrators without reliably distinguishing between the two. See Puig, supra note 3, at 17−18
(collecting information on ICSID arbitrators related to name, gender, and nationality); see
also Waibel & Wu, supra note 27 (collecting information on ICSID arbitrators only
including gender, nationality, age, and legal education). There is limited data on ICA, which
makes this research particularly valuable. But see supra note 4.
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Likewise, we are unaware of any research on demographic
information about the background of counsel in international
arbitration. This research offers a baseline for future inquiries.
Although it provides quantitative information on counsel, the
discussion in this section primarily focuses on international
arbitrators.
There have been suggestions in the popular press that
international arbitrators tend to be “pale, male, and stale.”66
Presuming the phrase reflects public concerns about diversity in
international arbitration, the question is whether inclusiveness (or
lack thereof) is empirically verifiable. We acknowledge that it is
difficult, if not impossible, to generate a unitary definition of
diversity and inclusiveness in international arbitration. We therefore
focus on several aspects to create a pluralistic assessment. First, we
explored the gender composition of ICCA subjects, as gender is
generally a stable characteristic. Second, we explored the age
distribution of ICCA participants. Third, we identified variations in
legal training, linguistic capacity, nationality, and development
status.67
Given the existing literature reflecting questions about gender
disparity in international arbitration, the descriptive data on gender is
vital. Table 3 reflects the gender distribution of participants,
arbitrators, and counsel. For all ICCA subjects and the subset of
counsel, roughly three-quarters were men, and one quarter were
women. The distribution shifted when evaluating those serving as
arbitrators—with men becoming even more dominant. Namely,
82.4% of arbitrators were men and 17.6% were women.
The results also suggest a degree of a “gray hair factor”
where, although all subjects were typically in their late forties, those
individuals serving as arbitrators were somewhat older. Table 3
indicates that the mean age of all subjects was 48 (median=47); and
mean counsel age (48) was similar (median=46). In contrast, the

66. Michael D. Goldhaber, Madame La Présidente: A Woman Who Sits As President
of a Major Arbitral Tribunal Is a Rare Creature. Why?, 1 TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. (2004),
www.transnational-dispute-management.com/article.asp?key=158
(“[A]rbitration
is
dominated by a few aging men, many of whom pioneered the field. In the words of Sarah
Francois-Poncet of Salans, the usual suspects are ‘pale, male, and stale.’”).
67. We recognize that defining diversity in international law is complex as notions of
“minority status” in national contexts may not apply on the international plane. For
example, although Gabrielle Kirk MacDonald is a U.S. national, which is an OECD and high
income state, she is an African-American woman. See infra note 142. We therefore look at
each diversity-related variable in isolation but welcome a more nuanced scale for classifying
diversity constructs in international law.
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mean age of responding arbitrators was 54 (median=53). These
results may not be unusual. Other research suggests the average age
of an active member of the bar in California was 48, whereas the
average age of California judges was 60;68 but the age of median
judges has been decreasing in several jurisdictions.69
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of Gender and Age for All ICCA Subjects, the
Subset of those Working as Arbitrators, and the Subset of those Working as
Counsel
Variables
Subject Gender:
Percentage
(Frequency)
Women
Men
Total number of
subjects
Subject Age:
Mean
Median
Minimum
Maximum
Standard deviation
Total number of
subjects

All

Arbitrators

Counsel

25.5% (n=134)
74.5% (n=392)

17.6% (n=46)
82.4% (n=216)

24.0% (n=99)
76.0% (n=314)

100% (n=526)

100% (n=262)

100% (n=413)

48.5
47.0
24.0
85.0
12.7

54.4
53.0
29.0
85.0
11.7

48.0
46.0
24.0
85.0
12.3

514

253

406

68. Arden Rowell & Jessica Bregant, Numeracy and Legal Decision Making, 46 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 191, 225 n.120 (2014).
69. See M. Margaret McKeown, The Internet and the Constitution: A Selective
Retrospective, 9 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 135, 142 (2014) (noting “the median age of
active judges has declined: from 58 years old in 1990 to 50 years old in 2010”); Abhinav
Chandrachud, Does Life Tenure Make Judges More Independent? A Comparative Study of
Judicial Appointments in India, 28 CONN. J. INT’L L. 297, 305–06 (2013) (indicating the
average age at appointment was fifty-four years for the Australian High Court, fifty-six years
for the Canadian Supreme Court, and sixty-four years in the Supreme Court of Japan but
noting that the average age at appointment was increasing in India and Japan).
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Age as a Function
of Gender:70
Age of Women
Mean
Median
Minimum
Maximum
Standard deviation
Total number of
Women
Age of Men
Mean
Median
Minimum
Maximum
Standard deviation
Total number of
Men

42.0
40.0
27.0
71.0
10.0

47.5
45.0
32.0
68.0
9.3

41.3
40.0
27.0
65.0
8.4

128

46

96

50.6
50.0
24.0
85.0
12.8

55.8
55.0
29.0
85.0
11.7

50.0
50.0
24.0
85.0
12.5

386

216

310

The age difference between male and female participants was
statistically meaningful.71 Using a t-test to analyze mean differences
in age,72 there was always a significant gender difference in the age
of ICCA subjects (t(512)=6.872, p<.001, r=.29, n=514), those
serving as counsel (t(404)=6.385, p<.001, r=.30, n=406), or those
serving as arbitrators (t(251)=4.337, p<.001, r=.26, n=253). The
effect sizes all suggested the size was statistically medium.73 The
direction was such that women attending ICCA, regardless of their

70. When looking at age as a function of gender, there were fewer subjects, as six men
and six women identified their gender but not their age.
71. Statistical significance “provides a measure to help us decide whether what we
observe in our sample is also going on in the population that the sample is supposed to
represent.” TIMOTHY C. URDAN, STATISTICS IN PLAIN ENGLISH 62 (3d ed. 2010).
72. An independent samples t-test evaluates group differences for a parameter with two
levels (like gender) and a normally distributed dependent variable (like age). Id. at 93.
73. See LOUIS COHEN ET AL., RESEARCH METHODS IN EDUCATION 113–16 (6th ed.
2007) (providing Cohen’s conventions for understanding effect sizes and indicating a
“small” effect is present when r=.10, a “medium” effect is present when r=.30, and a “large”
effect is present when r=.50), whereas effect sizes below r=.10 are less than “small” and
arguably of trivial impact).
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arbitration experience, were younger than men. Table 3 indicates
that, for women arbitrators, the average age was 47.5 whereas the
average age of male arbitrators was 55.8.
Another aspect of subjects’ diversity is type of legal training
received. Table 4 reflects that ICCA subjects had a variety of
different legal training. For all ICCA subjects, common law was the
dominant legal training, with 46% of the subjects exclusively trained
in a common law jurisdiction. There was also a strong civil law
component, with 30% of subjects trained exclusively as civil lawyers.
There was also a hybrid as 24% of subjects had training in both
common and civil law.74 The dominance of common law training
was also present in the subset of arbitrators, but was not as facially
prominent. Specifically, 38.5% percent of ICCA arbitrators had
training exclusively in common law whereas 33.8% of ICCA
arbitrators were exclusively trained as civil lawyers, and 27.7% of
ICCA arbitrators had training both in common and civil law.75
Language is another way to explore the diversity of
international arbitration. ICCA subjects spoke fifty-eight different
native languages. Although Mandarin and Spanish are the two most
prevalent languages in the world,76 this dominance was not present in
the ICCA subjects, the subset of counsel, or the subset of arbitrators.
For ICCA subjects generally and counsel, English, Spanish, and
Portuguese were most dominant, together accounting for nearly
seventy percent of the languages spoken. The proportions were
slightly different for the subset of arbitrators, as the dominant
languages were English, German, and French (responsible for over
sixty percent of total language capacity). Given the dominance of the
Chinese population worldwide, it was noteworthy that only four
arbitrators’ native language was either Mandarin or Cantonese.
As regards geography, ICCA subjects represented sixty
different nationalities.77 Table 4 indicates that, irrespective of
74. These proportions were similar for those serving as arbitration counsel.
75. The results reflect a case selection effect. In theory, more U.S. common-law
trained lawyers attended, as Miami was a geographically convenient forum. Future ICCA
researchers may wish to explore this issue further to see, as the venue changes, whether this
demographic aspect fluctuates or remains stable.
76. Summary by Language Size, ETHNOLOGUE: LANGUAGES
http://www.ethnologue.com/statistics/size (last visited May 16, 2015).

OF THE

WORLD,

77. For example, Asia has the largest population in the world, and Africa has the
second largest. Distribution of the Global Population 2014, by Continent, STATISTA,
http://www.statista.com/statistics/237584/distribution-of-the-world-population-by-continent
(last visited May 16, 2015); see also Current World Population, ONE WORLD NATIONS
ONLINE, http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/world_population.htm (last visited May 16,
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whether analyzing ICCA subjects or the subset of arbitrators, the
trend was to have the greatest representation from Europe and North
America; the lowest proportions came from Africa and Asia.78
When focusing on the subset of arbitrators, some nationalities
were arguably underrepresented. A potential assessment of under- or
over-representation could be evaluated using nationality information
about the parties or subject matter in dispute.79 This information is,
unfortunately, generally not publicly available, and international
arbitration institutions like ICSID,80 the LCIA,81 the ICDR,82 and the
2015).
78. There is a possible disjunction between arbitrators’ place of residence and their
state of origin or nationality. We used nationality, as it is an indicator of where individuals
express political or civil rights. Future research might also explore the variance by state of
residence, state where legal training was obtained, or another state reflecting a substantial tie
(i.e., location of property ownership).
79. Articles 39 and 53(3) of the ICSID Convention have nationality requirements that
would skew this analysis for ICSID Convention cases. Look at this rule for ad hoc
committees, for example:
“None of the members of the Committee shall have been a member of
the Tribunal which rendered the award, shall be of the same nationality
as any such member, shall be a national of the State party to the dispute
or of the State whose national is a party to the dispute, shall have been
designated to the Panel of Arbitrators by either of those States, or shall
have acted as a conciliator in the same dispute.”
80. ICSID’s statistics are relatively blunt. When focusing upon state respondents,
information generally is grouped by geographic region and information on investors is either
unavailable or grouped into geographic clusters. ICSID, THE ICSID CASELOAD—STATISTICS
(SPECIAL FOCUS—EUROPEAN UNION) 6, 11 (2014), available at https://icsid.world
bank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/resources/Documents/Stats%20EU%20Special%20Issue%20%20Eng.pdf [hereinafter EU STATISTICS]; 2014-1 STATISTICS, supra note 25, at 11, 25. But
see EU STATISTICS, supra note 80, at 7 (identifying EU states involved in ICSID cases).
Arbitrator appointments, however, are provided using arbitrator region and the specific
nationality. See EU STATISTICS, supra note 80, at 23−24; 2014−1 STATISTICS, supra note 25,
at 18−20, 30−32.
81. The LCIA provides statistics on party nationality in percentages, rather than filed
cases, and also sometimes groups together states. The most recent report indicated, between
2012−13, approximately 16−19% of parties were from the United Kingdom, 7−8% of parties
were from the United States, 3−5% of parties were Swiss, and 3−4% of parties were
Russian.
LCIA,
REGISTRAR’S
REPORT
2
(2013),
available
at
http://www.lcia.org/LCIA/reports.aspx.
82. The American Arbitration Association’s Centre for Dispute Resolution (ICDR),
makes general statements about expanding party nationality or provides grouped statistics
using “Europe, Middle East and Africa” to report party nationality. AMER. ARB. ASS’N,
2013 ANNUAL REPORT & FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 18 (May 15, 2014), available at
https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowProperty?nodeId=/UCM/ADRSTAGE2021420&revision=late
streleased; see also INT’L CENTRE FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, 3 THE ICDR INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION REPORTER 2–4 (July 2012), https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?doc=
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SCC83 do not provide systemic nationality data.84 In the absence of
such information, but the readily available information on global
population, we use global population85 and global gross domestic
purchasing power parity (global GDP)86 as comparative baselines.87
Although highest in world population (60.27%), Asian
arbitrators were the second least represented (10%) of ICCA
ADRSTG_019805.
83. The SCC provides the most constructive information and identifies party
nationality and number of cases. They report that Swedish parties dominate the caseload
with over 158 parties, while there were 15 Russian parties, 12 Norwegian parties, 12
German parties, and 7 Swiss parties. ARB. INST. OF THE STOCKHOLM CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE, STATISTICS 2013: A STRONG YEAR 2 (2013), available at http://www.scc
institute.com/media/45932/scc-statistics-2013.pdf.
84. The ICC provides data on party nationality; but it is only available for a fee.
Statistical Reports, INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE: DISPUTE RESOLUTION LIBRARY,
available at http://www.iccdrl.com/statisticalreports.aspx (last visited May 16, 2015).
85. See supra note 77.
86. Given the temporal gap between commercial activity and the start of arbitration,
we initially focused upon global GDP between 2000−2010. See Report for Selected
Countries and Subjects, INT’L MONETARY FUND (October 2014), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2014/02/weodata/weorept.aspx?pr.x=17&pr.y=6&s
y=1980&ey=2016&scsm=1&ssd=1&sort=country&ds=.&br=1&c=512,941,914,446,612,66
6,614,668,311,672,213,946,911,137,193,962,122,674,912,676,313,548,419,556,513,678,316
,181,913,682,124,684,339,273,638,921,514,948,218,943,963,686,616,688,223,518,516,728,
918,558,748,138,618,196,522,278,622,692,156,694,624,142,626,449,628,564,228,283,924,8
53,233,288,632,293,636,566,634,964,238,182,662,453,960,968,423,922,935,714,128,862,61
1,716,321,456,243,722,248,942,469,718,253,724,642,576,643,936,939,961,644,813,819,199
,172,184,132,524,646,361,648,362,915,364,134,732,652,366,174,734,328,144,258,146,656,
463,654,528,336,923,263,738,268,578,532,537,944,742,176,866,534,369,536,744,429,186,4
33,925,178,869,436,746,136,926,343,466,158,112,439,111,916,298,664,927,826,846,542,29
9,967,582,443,474,917,754,544,698&s=NGDPD,PPPGDP&grp=0&a=.
87. As discussed earlier, there is no central, public repository on information about
arbitrators or all international commercial disputes.
See supra notes 10−26 and
accompanying text. As we appreciate that comparisons using party nationality or location of
the subject matter of the dispute provide a better uniform baseline, we encourage
international arbitration institutions to collaborate to create and provide such information to
the public. Likewise, it might be useful to identify foreign investment flows as an
alternative proxy, although selecting the time period for the comparison may prove
challenging given shifts in global investment flows and the decades of accumulated
experience from international arbitrators. Focusing on either inbound or outbound
investment flows, however, may not fully capture trans-border economic activity and could
miss other economic activity including locally financed assets, mergers and acquisitions,
portfolio investment, intellectual property transfers, and other types of critical international
commercial activity. Future research could therefore explore the appropriateness of other
potential baselines and how those measures might suggest alternative understandings of
representativeness in international arbitration.
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arbitrators. Notably, although China and India together contain
approximately 33% of the world’s population and roughly 30.4% of
global GDP, less than 3% of participating arbitrators were from those
states. Meanwhile, despite Africa’s second highest population
(15.41%), only two African countries were in the twenty countries
with the highest global GDP (Egypt and Nigeria—2.5%) and Africa
exhibited the lowest level of representation (0.4%).
Other
nationalities were arguably over-represented. Europe has 10.37% of
the world’s population and roughly 12.8% of global GDP, but 48.2%
of the arbitrators were European nationals. Similarly, the United
States and Canada have 4.93% of the world’s population and 14.5%
of global GDP, but 27.9% of the ICCA arbitrators were from North
America, and of the seventy arbitrators from North America, only
one was from Mexico. Other states were somewhat more balanced in
representation. For example, Australia and New Zealand contain not
quite one percent of world population and less than one percent of
global GDP;88 they represented four percent of ICCA arbitrators.
Although South America has 8.49% of world population, 9.6% of
ICCA arbitrators were from South America.89
Table 4: Percentages and Frequency Distributions (in parentheses) of Legal
Education, Native Language, Continent, and Nationality for All ICCA
Subjects, the Subset of those Working as Arbitrators and the Subset of those
Working as Counsel
Variables
Legal Education
Common Law
Civil Law
Both
Total number of subjects
Mother Tongue
English
Spanish
Portuguese

All

Arbitrators

Counsel

45.7% (n=237)
30.3% (n=157)
24.1% (n=125)

38.5% (n=100)
33.8% (n=88)
27.7% (n=72)

44.6% (n=184)
29.1% (n=120)
26.4% (n=109)

519

260

413

48.6% (n=248)
10.2% (n=52)
9.4% (n=48)

43.3% (n=110)
7.1% (n=18)
8.3% (n=21)

47.4% (n=191)
10.4% (n=42)
10.7% (n=43)

88. Using nominal GDP unadjusted for PPP, Australia had roughly 2.7% of GDP.
89. Table 4 reflects that the strongest representation from Latin America was Brazilian.
Given ICCA-related outreach, it is possible that earlier ICCA Congresses and/or geographic
proximity may affect participation in future conferences and grow the global arbitration
community. Brazil, however, was also one of the top twenty largest contributors to global
GDP, representing three percent of global GDP.

2015] THE DIVERSITY CHALLENGE IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 459
German
French
Dutch
Other languages
Total native languages
Total number of subjects
Continent
Europe
North America
South America
Asia
Australia / New Zealand
Africa
Total number of subjects
Nationality
United States
United Kingdom
Brazil
France
Australia
Germany
Canada
Switzerland
China
India
Sweden
Netherlands
Spain
South Korea
Italy
Argentina
Austria
Philippines
Portugal
Russia

6.5% (n=33)
5.7% (n=29)
2.2% (n=11)
17.4% (n=89)

10.6% (n=27)
10.2% (n=26)
3.5% (n=9)
17.0% (n=43)

6.5% (n=26)
6.5% (n=26)
2.7% (n=11)
15.8% (n=64)

38

26

32

510

254

403

36.4% (n=183)
33.6% (n=169)
12.7% (n=64)
10.9% (n=55)
4.6% (n=23)
1.8% (n=9)

48.2% (n=121)
27.9% (n=70)
9.6% (n=24)
10.0% (n=25)
4.0% (n=10)
0.4% (n=1)

37.2% (n=148)
31.4% (n=125)
14.3% (n=57)
11.1% (n=44)
4.8% (n=19)
1.3% (n=5)

503

251

398

29.0% (n=145)
10.6% (n=53)
8.6% (n=43)
5.0% (n=25)
3.8% (n=9)
3.6% (n=18)
3.4% (n=17)
2.8% (n=14)
2.6% (n=13)
2.4% (n=12)
2.4% (n=12)
1.8% (n=9)
1.8% (n=9)
1.6% (n=8)
1.1% (n=6)
1.0% (n=5)
1.0% (n=5)
1.0% (n=5)
1.0% (n=5)
1.0% (n=5)

23.2% (n=58)
9.6% (n=24)
7.2% (n=18)
8.8% (n=22)
2.8% (n=7)
4.8% (n=12)
4.8% (n=12)
5.6% (n=14)
1.2% (n=3)
1.6% (n=4)
2.8% (n=7)
2.4% (n=6)
2.4% (n=6)
2.4% (n=6)
2.0% (n=5)
0.4% (n=1)
2.0% (n=5)
0.4% (n=1)
1.2% (n=3)
1.6% (n=4)

26.8% (n=106)
10.4% (n=41)
9.6% (n=38)
6.1% (n=24)
4.3% (n=17)
3.0% (n=12)
4.1% (n=16)
3.5% (n=14)
1.5% (n=6)
2.8% (n=11)
2.8% (n=11)
2.3% (n=9)
2.0% (n=8)
1.8% (n=7)
0.8% (n=3)
1.0% (n=4)
1.0% (n=4)
1.0% (n=4)
1.3% (n=5)
0.5% (n=2)
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4.4% (n=82)90

12.8%(n=32) 91

13.9% (n=53) 92

58 93

41

47

500

250

395

—

10.0% (n=1)
20.0% (n=2)

19.4% (n=6)
16.1% (n=5)
9.7% (n=3)
9.7% (n=3)
6.5% (n=2)
3.2% (n=1)
6.5% (n=2)

Total number of Subjects
Dual Nationals
United States
Italy
United Kingdom
Germany
Australia
Brazil
Switzerland

17.6% (n=6)
14.7% (n=5)
11.8% (n=4)
8.8% (n=3)
5.9% (n=2)
5.9% (n=2)
5.9% (n=2)

Other Dual Nationalities

29.4% (n=10) 94

10% (n=1) 95

28.9% (n=9) 96

Total number of Subjects

34

10

31

10.0% (n=1)
20.0% (n=2)
30.0% (n=3)

—

90. This table reflects only those nationalities where, for all ICCA subjects, there were
five or more nationals from the country. Thirty-eight other states had at least one but less
than five subjects each, namely: Bahrain, Belgium, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba,
Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Finland, Georgia, Ghana, Greece,
Guatemala, Haiti, Ireland, Jamaica, Japan, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Morocco, New
Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Peru, Rwanda, Singapore, Slovakia, South Africa, Syria,
Tanzania, Tunisia, Ukraine, Venezuela, and Vietnam.
91. The other primary nationalities of arbitrators were Belgium, Bolivia, Chile, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Finland, Georgia, Greece, Guatemala, Ireland, Japan, Malaysia,
Mexico, New Zealand, Nigeria, Peru, Singapore, Slovakia, Ukraine, Venezuela, and
Vietnam.
92. The other primary nationalities of counsel were Belgium, Bolivia, Colombia, Cuba,
Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, Georgia, Greece, Guatemala, Jamaica, Japan,
Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand, Nigeria, Peru, Singapore, Slovakia, South
Africa, Ukraine, Venezuela, and Vietnam.
93. For both primary and secondary nationalities, there were sixty different states.
94. This table reflects only dual nationals where there were two or more nationals for
all ICCA subjects. There were also single dual nationals from Czech Republic, France, New
Zealand, Spain, Venezuela, Uruguay, Lebanon, Ireland, Nigeria, and Portugal.
95. This dual national arbitrator was from Nigeria.
96. There were also dual nationals from the Czech Republic, France, Ireland, Lebanon,
Nigeria, Portugal, Spain, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
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Historically, much literature has focused upon the prevalence
of “western” parties in international law;97 in a post-Cold War era
with different policy concerns, this terminology is somewhat
outmoded. As a final aspect for measuring the scope of diversity, we
therefore explored the development status of subjects’ nationality.98
Defining “Development Status” is a perpetual challenge, as there is
no consistent legal definition.99 Development has a degree of
subtlety and can mean different things to different people. For
example, the World Trade Organization does not offer a precise
measurement for development; rather, it permits member states to
self-define development.100 The lack of a consistent definition has
caused confusion in international law.101 Without a predefined,
exclusive measure, it is appropriate to use measures based upon
“judgments made for entirely different purposes by other
researchers.”102
97. See, e.g., Kurt Gaubatz & Matthew MacArthur, How International is
“International” Law?, 22 MICH. J. INT’L L. 239 (2001); see also Puig, supra note 3, at 19
(identifying that, for only ICSID arbitration, “most arbitrators are from specific developed
countries. Individuals of seven nations (New Zealand, Australia, Canada, Switzerland,
France, the UK, and the US) represent almost half of total appointments”).
98. Future analysis might explore country of residence, as nationality and residency are
not necessarily equivalent. Given limited time and space constraints, we selected nationality
to identify where the international arbitration pipeline derives, rather than where they reside
currently. Using nationality and residency together might also provide evidence of the
mobility of the international legal services market. David S. Law, Globalization and the
Future of Constitutional Rights, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 1227, 1323–30 (2008); see also ORLY
LOBEL, TALENT WANTS TO BE FREE: WHY WE SHOULD LEARN TO LOVE LEAKS, RAIDS, AND
FREE RIDING (2013).
99. Marc L. Bush & Eric Reinhard, Developing Countries and General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement, 37 J. WORLD TRADE 719,
719, 723 (2003) (analyzing development dimensions in GATT disputes and observing the
difficulty in making distinctions between developed and developing states).
100. See Who are the Developing Countries in the WTO?, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/d1who_e.htm (“There are no WTO definitions
of ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ countries. Members announce for themselves whether they
are ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ countries.”) (last visited May 16, 2015); see also Anu
Bradford & Eric A. Posner, Universal Exceptionalism in International Law, 52 HARV. INT’L
L.J. 1, 32 n.159 (2011) (“WTO rules do not contain a definition of a ‘developing country.’
Instead, states self-designate themselves as developed or developing countries as part of a
political calculus.”); Andrew D. Mitchell & Joanne Wallis, Pacific Pause: The Rhetoric of
Special & Differential Treatment, The Reality of WTO Accession, 27 WISC. INT’L L.J. 663,
696–97 (2010).
101. Benjamin L. Liebman, Autonomy Through Separation?: Environmental Law and
the Basic Law of Hong Kong, 39 HARV. INT’L L.J. 231, 261–62 (1998).
102. GARY KING ET AL., DESIGNING SOCIAL ENQUIRY: SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE IN
QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 157 (1994) (emphasis in original); see also Susan D. Franck et al.,
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We used three measures to define development status.103
First, development was operationalized as a binary categorical
variable—OECD Status—that derived from a state’s membership in
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD). OECD membership is generally, but not always, associated
with higher levels of development and therefore is a blunt proxy.104
Second, development was also operationalized using a four-category
variable—World Bank Status—that derived from a World Bank
classification system grouping states as High Income, Upper-Middle
Income, Lower-Middle Income, and Low Income.105 The World
Bank’s main criterion for classifying economies is gross national
income per capita.106 Third, development status was operationalized
using a continuous variable—HDI status—from the United Nations
Development Programme’s Human Development Index (HDI). HDI
evaluates elements including life expectancy, education, and income.
HDI is a continuous variable and ranges from 0.0 (undeveloped) to
1.0 (completely developed).107
Regardless of which measure was used, the results indicated
that nationals from developed states dominated the roster of all ICCA
subjects generally, as well as the subsets of counsel and arbitrators.
For all groups, Table 5 demonstrates that seventy-five percent (or
more for the subset of arbitrators) of subjects were from an OECD or
High Income state; and we observe that none of the ICCA subjects
were arbitrators or counsel from Low Income states. There were
similar results for those who were dual nationals. Using HDI scores
frames the demographics more starkly for the subset of arbitrators.
The median HDI score for arbitrators meant that half of the

Through the Looking Glass: Understanding Social Science Norms for Analyzing
International Investment Law, 2010-11 Y.B. ON INT’L INVESTMENT L. & POL’Y 883 (2011).
103. Irrespective of the measure used for coding development, all codes were generated
using the scores available in 2014.
104. Jan Wouters & Sven Van Kerckhoven, The OECD and the G20: An Ever Closer
Relationship?, 43 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV 345 (2011).
105. The World Bank analytical classifications used for coding are available at Country
and Lending Groups, WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-and-lendinggroups (last visited May 16, 2015).
BANK,
106. Data:
How
we
Classify
Countries,
WORLD
https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/378834-how-does-the-worldbank-classify-countries (last visited May 16, 2015).
107. As HDI coding methodology changed in 2011, we used data provided by Dr.
Milorad Kovacevic, Chief Statistician at the Human Development Report Office of the
United Nations Development Programme. All of scores from Dr. Kovacevic used the
updated 2011 methodology to re-evaluate the historical and current rankings.
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arbitrators were from states with “very high human development” as
classified by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP),
and were in the top twelve most developed nations; using the mean
meant that the average arbitrator came from a state whose HDI score
put it in the top thirty most developed states in the world.108
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics of the Development Status of All ICCA
Subjects, the Subset of Arbitrators, and the Subset of Counsel as a Function of
OECD Membership, World Bank Classification, and the Human Development
Index.109
Variables
OECD Nationals:
Percentage (Frequency)
OECD national
Non-OECD national
Totals
OECD Dual Nationals:
Percentage (Frequency)
OECD national
Non-OECD national

All

Arbitrators

Counsel

74.6% (n=373)
25.4% (n=127)

82.4% (n=206)
17.6% (n=44)

75.2% (n=297)
24.8% (n=98)

100% (n=500)

100% (n=250)

100% (n=395)

79.4% (n=27)
20.6% (n=7)

80.0% (n=8)
20.0% (n=2)

80.6% (n=25)
19.4% (n=6)

Totals
World Bank
Classification of Primary
Nationality:
Percentage (Frequency)
High income
Upper-middle income
Lower-middle income
Low income

100% (n=34)

100% (n=10)

100% (n=31)

76.4% (n=382)
16.6% (n=83)
6.4% (n=32)
0.6% (n=3)

84.8% (n=212)
10.8% (n=27)
4.4% (n=11)
—

76.5% (n=302)
16.7% (n=66)
6.8% (n=27)
—

Totals

100% (n=500)

100% (n=250)

100% (n=395)

108. This shifted only slightly for arbitrators who were dual nationals. For those
arbitrators with dual nationalities from states with “very high human development,” the
median HDI score was in the top seventeen most developed states and the mean HDI score
was in the top thirty-five states.
109. Forty-eight subjects did not provide nationality information.
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World Bank
Classification of
Secondary Nationality:
Percentage (Frequency)
High income
Upper-middle income
Lower-middle income
Low income
Totals
HDI Classification of
Primary nationality
Mean
Minimum
1st quartile
2nd quartile (median)
3rd quartile
Maximum
Standard deviation
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85.3% (n=29)
11.8% (n=4)
2.9% (n=1)
—

80.0% (n=8)
10.0% (n=1)
10.0% (n=1)
—

87.1%(n=27)
9.7%(n=3)
3.2%(n=1)
—

100% (n=34)

100% (n=10)

100% (n=31)

0.859
0.434
0.816
0.909
0.937
0.955

0.874
0.471
0.875
0.909
0.937
0.938

0.860
0.471
0.816
0.909
0.937
0.938

0.105

0.086

0.102

Total number of subjects
HDI classification of
Secondary nationality
Mean
Minimum
1st quartile
2nd quartile (median)
3rd quartile
Maximum

500

250

395

0.868
0.471
0.875
0.883
0.924
0.938

0.842
0.471
0.839
0.897
0.920
0.920

0.870
0.471
0.875
0.885
0.937
0.938

Standard deviation

0.094

0.142

0.095

34

10

31

Total number of subjects

It is possible that these data did not fully reflect the global
international arbitration community. Nevertheless, the data offer
previously unavailable cross-sectional information about the
prevalence of men (Table 3), certain nationalities (Table 4), and
developed world actors (Table 5).
The data may reflect a potential “pipeline” problem related to
capacity-building in international arbitration. While an analysis of
the origins of diversity challenges in international adjudication is
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beyond the scope of this Article,110 we note that not all states have
the same level of legal infrastructure; and the men and women of
states with less developed legal education systems might be less well
represented in international arbitration.111 Separately, not all states
are equally supportive of women’s education—legal education
specifically—or may have other non-legal barriers that make
women’s professional work challenging. Even if states support of
women’s education today, they may not have historically invested in
women’s education or professional training. It is also possible that,
as international law courts and tribunals generally exhibit diversity
challenges,112 the data reflect larger diversity challenges in
international law. These findings require replication to assess their
ongoing value and explore whether the international arbitration
community changes over time.113
D. Key Findings

The data reflect that counsel and arbitrators were the primary
ICCA attendees and presumably core members of the “invisible
college.” The standard number of appointments for counsel ranged
from a mean of thirty to a median of fifteen. For those appointed as
110. Future work may explore theories explaining the systematic representation of
women and/or developing world arbitrators. Others have explored the lack of women in
judicial positions generally or international courts and tribunals, which could have
similarities to in international arbitration. See Nienke Grossman, Shattering the Glass
Ceiling in International Adjudication (forthcoming), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2472054 (exploring theories to explain the lack of women
adjudicators in public international law); see infra note 146 and accompanying text
(exploring theories about women’s lack of presence on the bench).
111. See Greenwood & Baker, supra note 30, at 654, 657 (identifying that “the
additional obstacles which an international arbitrator must overcome in order to succeed may
penalize women disproportionately” and discussing how factors “including office climate,
difficulties in managing dual careers, lack of female role models and mentors, lack of
flexible work options and attitudes to flexible working” can contribute to a “pipeline leak”).
112. See Nienke Grossman, Sex on the Bench: Do Women Judges Matter to the
Legitimacy of International Courts, 12 CHI. J. INT’L L. 647 (2012) (identifying the lack of
women on international courts and tribunals).
113. Greenwood and Baker suggested that problems in international arbitration extend
beyond having sufficient women in the pipeline. They acknowledge that even though there
are fewer men than women entering U.K. law firms, more men become partners. They also
observe that the “best estimates of 6% of women appointed as arbitrators on international
arbitration tribunals is just over half the 11% figure for female partners on international
arbitration teams.” Greenwood & Baker, supra note 30, at 658. But see Stipanowich, supra
note 4, at 56 (identifying that roughly 15% of international arbitration respondents in his
study were women).

466

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[53:429

arbitrators, individuals obtained thirty-five appointments on average,
but only a median of ten. The number of ICA appointments was
generally larger than ITA appointments. The ICCA data did not
reflect large numbers of public international law and national court
judges in the dataset.
ICCA subjects were representative of arbitration specialists
from many continents, nationalities, languages, and legal training.
Within that breadth, there were notable concentrations that tended to
be dominant in terms of size; the data confirmed narratives regarding
a lack of diversity in the field of international arbitration. Counsel
and arbitrators were predominantly from developed states, with a
higher concentration of developed state subjects in the subset of
arbitrators. Likewise, counsel and arbitrators were predominantly
male, with higher proportions of men in the subset of arbitrators.
Meanwhile, we identified a statistically meaningful age difference
between men and women arbitrators, such that males were older and
females were younger.
The “median international arbitrator”114 was a fifty-three
year-old man who was a national of a developed state and had served
as arbitrator in ten arbitration cases; and the median international
counsel was a forty-six year-old man who was a national of a
developed state and had served in fifteen arbitrations.
The
demographic data offers preliminary information about the
practitioners and adjudicators of international dispute settlement. In
contrast to the “invisible college” of international law professionals
described by Schachter,115 this information aids in the
114. Other research has explored the attributes of median judges, often in the context of
panel decision-making. See Lee Epstein & Tonja Jacobi, Super Medians, 61 STAN. L. REV.
37, 47–49 (2008) (discussing “median judges” in various contexts); Andrew D. Martin,
Kevin M. Quinn & Lee Epstein, The Median Justice on the United States Supreme Court, 83
N.C. L. REV. 1275, 1277 (2005) (discussing and defining the “median justice” in the context
of the U.S. Supreme Court empirical research); see also Michael Abramowicz, A
Compromise Approach to Compromise Verdicts, 89 CAL. L. REV. 231, 309–10 (2001)
(discussing median judges). The “median arbitrator” is a composite of the median
characteristics from this Article, which inevitably means the characteristics could refer to an
individual who may not actually exist. We hope that the imbuing measures of central
tendency within a single, albeit potentially fictional, repository offers a useful construct.
115. See Schachter, supra note 1, at 217 (“the professional community of international
lawyers . . . though dispersed throughout the world and engaged in diverse occupations . . .
[is] a kind of invisible college dedicated to a common intellectual enterprise.”); see also
Harlan G. Cohen, Lawyers and Precedent, 46 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1025 (2013); Tom
Dannenbaum, Nationality and the International Judge: The Nationalist Presumption
Governing the International Judiciary and Why it Must be Reversed, 45 CORNELL INT’L L.J.
77, 129–31 (2012) (discussing the “invisible college” involved in international dispute
settlement that begins from legal education and grows through transnational legal dialogues
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demystification of international arbitration and offers data to the
arbitration community.
IV. PERCEIVED DIVERSITY CHALLENGES
Several scholars identify that the diversity of those presiding
over adjudicatory bodies, particularly international courts and
tribunals, is an important factor for the legitimacy of those bodies.116
Nienke Grossman argues that adjudicative bodies “where one sex is
severely under- or over-represented lack normative legitimacy
because they are inherently biased.”117 Even if men and women do
not decide cases differently,118 she posits, “sex representation matters
for sociological legitimacy because relevant constituencies believe
they do” and “representativeness is an important democratic
value.”119 As a result, concerns related to diversity in international

amongst law firms and other networks).
116. See generally Grossman, supra note 110 (exploring how women’s participation on
international courts and tribunals affects their legitimacy); see also Sally J. Kenney,
Breaking the Silence: Gender Mainstreaming and the Composition of the European Court
of Justice, 10 FEMINIST LEGAL STUD. 257, 265–66 (2002) (exploring whether the paucity of
women on the European Court of Justice’s bench affects its legitimacy and why); Leigh
Swigart, The “National Judge”: Some Reflections on Diversity in International Courts and
Tribunals, 42 MCGEORGE L. REV. 223, 224 (2010) (“Like their domestic counterparts,
international courts and tribunals depend on public faith in their judges to inspire confidence
in court decisions and in the judicial system more generally.”).
117. Grossman, Sex on the Bench, supra note 112, at 652.
118. In other contexts, more diverse decision-makers have made different, and more
legally accurate, legal assessments. See Jennifer L. Peresie, Note, Female Judges Matter:
Gender and Collegial Decisionmaking in the Federal Appellate Courts, 114 YALE L.J. 1759
(2005) (identifying that the presence of at least one female judge on panels reviewing sexual
harassment and sex discrimination cases was more than twice as likely to find for plaintiffs);
Samuel R. Sommers, On Racial Diversity and Group Decision Making: Identifying Multiple
Effects of Racial Composition on Jury Deliberations, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
579 (2006) (finding that diversifying mock jury panels created broader information
exchanges and decreased risk of error). It is possible, but not certain, that panels with
diverse arbitrators could make different decisions.
119. Grossman, Sex on the Bench, supra note 112, at 652. Grossman suggests this is
true only where men and women think differently or approach cases in a different way as
those making decisions should reflect those affected by the decisions.
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arbitration impact its symbolic legitimacy120 and, more broadly, that
of international courts and tribunals.121
For ITA, as a hybrid creature involving public international
law, concerns about sociological legitimacy, democratic legitimacy,
and democracy deficits are especially relevant.122 Concerns about
diversity also impact the legitimacy of ICA and disputes purely
among private parties. Although the New York Convention123 and
UNCITRAL Model Law124 require domestic judiciaries to give
arbitration awards deference, that deference derives from trust in the
integrity of arbitrators and the arbitral process. Consequently,
domestic courts need not give international arbitration procedures or
awards carte blanche and they retain the power to oversee the parties,
their lawyers, and the arbitrators.
Some jurisdictions have
historically expressed a “judicial hostility” to arbitration, and others
have perceived arbitration as an unwarranted intrusion into state
authority.125 States permit and honor arbitration proceedings, in part,
because of their perceived utility; should those courts or legislatures
believe that ICA is illegitimate or problematic, they retain the
capacity to re-absorb those cases into judicial dockets. There have
been calls to regulate international arbitration more closely regardless

120. See infra notes 214, 223 and accompanying text (discussing Thomas Franck’s
conceptions of legitimacy, including symbolic legitimacy, and implications for international
law).
121. See Kumar & Rose, supra note 60, at 25−26 (calling for empirical research
comparing diversity imbalances at the ICJ with international arbitration).
122. See Nienke Grossman, Legitimacy and International Adjudicative Bodies, 41 GEO.
WASH. INT’L L. REV. 107 (2009) (discussing a sociological approach to legitimacy); Nienke
Grossman, The Normative Legitimacy of International Courts, 86 TEMP. L. REV. 61 (2013)
(discussing a democratic theory of legitimacy); see also Daniel Bodansky, The Legitimacy of
International Governance: A Coming Challenge for International Environmental Law?, 93
AM. J. INT’L L. 596, 601 (1999) (asserting that popular views about an authority comprise
one dimension of that authority’s legitimacy); Allen Buchanan & Robert O. Keohane, The
Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions, 20 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 405, 405–06 (2006)
(suggesting that a global public standard of legitimacy can help citizens distinguish
legitimate institutions from illegitimate ones).
123. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June
10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter New York Convention].
124. UNCITRAL Model Law on Int’l Com. Arb., G.A. Res. 61/33, U.N. Doc. A/40/17,
annex I & A/61/17, annex I (July 7, 2006), available at http://www.uncitral.org/
pdf/english/texts/arbitration/ml-arb/07-86998_Ebook.pdf (last accessed July 31, 2014).
125. See, e.g., Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510 (1974) (noting
“centuries of judicial hostility to arbitration agreements”); GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 1.01 (2d ed. 2014) (providing a brief history of international
commercial arbitration).
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of whether a dispute involves a state or state-related entity.126 Even
private dispute resolution, therefore, is dependent on public trust.127
As Salim Moollan observed, there are risks when international
arbitration is viewed as an imposed, foreign process.128 There is a
risk that international arbitration could be seen not simply as an
alternative method of dispute resolution, but as a shadow legal
system.
Diversity concerns are not unique to international
arbitration.129
As a report by Oxford Economics explains,
“[e]mployee diversity—across lines of gender, ethnicity, country of
birth, age, and others—has become a hot boardroom topic across the
globe. It is becoming not only a critical issue for human resources
(HR) executives, but a major part of corporate strategy.”130 Some
suggest that, “diversity should be considered by both policymakers
and businesses when making investment and policy decisions as it
126. See, e.g., Sundaresh Menon, International Arbitration: The Coming of a New Age
for Asia (and Elsewhere), Remarks at the Singapore ICCA Congress, ¶43 (2012), available
at
http://www.arbitration-icca.org/media/0/13398435632250/ags_opening_speech_icca_
congress_2012.pdf (“As we contemplate these problems of moral hazard, ethics, inadequate
supply and conflicts of interests associated with international arbitrators, it seems surprising
that there are no controls or regulations to maintain the quality, standards and legitimacy of
the industry.”); Sundaresh Menon, Where We Have Been, Where We Should Go, in ICCA
MIAMI CONGRESS PROCEEDINGS, supra note 32, at 1035 (“I believe that this is the essential
challenge of this age—we are moving very rapidly from a time when the key players knew
one another; when they often looked similar and spoke similarly; and when they had a
common legal, cultural and social background; to a period in which there is unprecedented
growth in numbers and in diversity.”).
127. Parties only have the right to choose arbitration, and choose their arbitrators, where
states generate laws granting parties those rights. This reflects that, while party autonomy is
a critical value in international arbitration, it is not the only value.
128. See Moollan, supra note 52, at 2:12–3:16 (observing the disjunction between “the
formal discourse repeated at every conference we go to emphasizing the inclusiveness of
international arbitration” and “the perception of our field, in the developing world as
predominantly Euro- and American-centric” and suggesting that this gives “rise to a risk of
arbitration being perceived as foreign process imposed from abroad, as an unwanted but
inevitable corollary of trade and investment flows” but suggesting “the answer to this is to
make sure that the developing world has its say in the process and in its development and for
international arbitration to progressively to become part and parcel of the legal culture of
developing countries”).
129. Other aspects of diversity that are worthy of exploration, which we did not have the
time or space to explore, involved sexual orientation, religion, marital status, disability, or
medical condition. See generally Davis, supra note 4 (exploring the gender, race, disability,
and sexual orientation of international arbitrators in the United States).
130. OXFORD ECON., THE GLOBAL DIVERSITY REPORT: AN ANNUAL GUIDE TO MEASURE
GLOBAL EMPLOYEE DIVERSITY 1 (2011), available at https://www.oxford
economics.com/my-oxford/projects/128931.
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can affect competitiveness which is key to economic growth and the
quality of life of a nation’s citizens.”131 This section, therefore, first
explores the basic demographics of international arbitration and
places those findings within a larger context. The section then
explores subjects’ perceptions about potential diversity challenges
within international arbitration; and it then contrasts this with
subjects’ actual experiences as arbitrators and counsels to explore
their actual experiences with the diversity of international arbitrators.
Finally, it explores the implications for justice and legitimacy within
international arbitration.
A. Contextualizing the Demographics of Diversity

Earlier, Tables 2−5 offered descriptive data on diversity levels
within the international arbitration community. The data suggested
the “median” ICCA subject and arbitration counsel was a male, fortysix years of age, with some common law legal training, from a
developed state. In contrast, the “median” arbitrator at ICCA was a
male, fifty-three years of age, with some training from a common law
jurisdiction, and from a developed state. Less than eighteen percent
of the arbitrators were women,132 twenty percent (or less) were from
131. Id. at 21.
132. We would be remiss not to recall that women arbitrators were statistically younger
(forty-eight years old on average) than their male counterparts (fifty-six years old on
average). Given this possibility, one might expect a slightly lower representation of women
with the need to achieve the requisite years of experience. Greenwood and Baker suggest
that female partners make up about eleven percent of international arbitration teams; and
when compared to their data on arbitrators, they infer that less than half of that eleven
percent serve as arbitrators and thereby suffer from “more than the usual ‘pipeline leak.’”
Greenwood & Baker, supra note 30, at 658. This creates three possibilities. First,
Greenwood and Baker’s extrapolation that women account for six percent of international
arbitrators could be wrong, and their derivative inference is incorrect. Second, it means that
the seventeen percent proportion of women arbitrators in our sample was over-representative
of women arbitrators. This could reflect that either women who have multiple appointments
elect to attend ICCA or benefit from ICCA networking opportunities. But see Stipanowich,
supra note 4, at 56–57 (identifying that roughly fifteen percent of subjects in a survey of
international arbitrators were women). Third, as several studies identified that women
accounted for five to nine percent of the ITA arbitrator pool, there may be meaningful
differences in the appointment of women in ICA and ITA arbitration and there may be
comparatively more women acting as ICA arbitrators. At present, we believe the most
plausible scenario is that our dataset reflects a slightly higher proportion of female
arbitrators than the general population. For the subset of ITA arbitrators, there were nine
female subjects (13.4%) and fifty-eight men (86.6%). This is facially distinguishable from
recent research about ITA where, out of a pool of 248 arbitrators, there were nine women
(3.6%) arbitrating cases generating a public award prior to 2012. FRANCK, supra note 29;
see also Franck, Empirically Evaluating, supra note 28, at 81 (identifying 5 women (3.5%)
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non-OECD or non-High Income states, and HDI scores reflected that
the median arbitrator was from one of the top twelve most developed
states in the world. These results suggest that: (1) women’s presence
in international arbitration has been relatively small; and (2) the
proportion of developing world arbitrators has been relatively small.
Although international arbitration involves transnational
dispute settlement, the measures of central tendency supported
narratives of a relatively non-diverse, homogenous group populating
international arbitration. Put another way, the descriptive data
provide preliminary evidence suggesting that critiques that
international arbitration lacks diversity are not stylized facts, but
reflect empirically verified data. Nevertheless, the data must be
viewed in context. While difficult to point to perfect diversity
balance in elite positions, some communities meet diversity
challenges better than others.
B. More Relative Success with Diversity

There are a variety of professional contexts in which women
and minorities have been represented well, albeit not perfectly.
These areas involve the public sector, including domestic legislative
and judicial branches, and some areas within the private sector.
Several national legislatures exhibited better diversity
indicators than international arbitration. For instance, as of 2013, the
countries where women had the largest proportions of elected
representatives included Sweden (forty-seven percent), Iceland
(forty-three percent), Argentina (forty-three percent), The
Netherlands (forty-two percent), and Finland (forty-two percent).133
According to Women in National Parliaments, in 2014, out of the
149 countries surveyed, thirty-five countries (including Rwanda,
Ecuador, Mexico, Serbia, and Burundi) had more than thirty percent
female representation in their lower houses.134 Recent data indicated
out of a pool of 145 arbitrators in pre-2007 awards). If the third possibility is also correct,
however, the sample may simply be over-representative of ITA, rather than ICA, women
arbitrators. This is a realistic possibility as, for our subset of ICA arbitrators, 45 (17.3%)
were women.
133. GLOBAL DIVERSITY REPORT, supra note 130, at 10 (citing the United Nations,
Women’s Indicators and Statistics Database).
134. World Classification, WOMEN IN NAT’L PARLIAMENTS (Apr. 1, 2014),
http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm. There were, however, thirty-two states where
women in national legislatures accounted for less than eleven percent. Id. There was also
wide variation in women’s representation in upper houses. Some states, however, have
quotas that promote gender diversity. For example, the Government of Iraq and the Kurdish
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that in OECD states the average proportion of female representation
in parliaments was twenty-six percent; and while women in OECD
states occupied over fifty percent of central government jobs, they
held twenty-nine percent of elite management positions.135
Research on national judiciaries offers instructive
comparative information about diversity related to gender and race.
Many—but not all—countries do better than international arbitration
in having women in positions of key adjudicative responsibility.
Several countries in the European Union have had success in
equalizing the representation of women in their domestic
judiciaries.136 Some countries have more than fifty percent women in
their judiciaries including Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Czech
Republic, France, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Montenegro, Poland,
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia,137 and Israel.138 Yet even for countries
that have experienced success in bringing women to the bench, many
women were not in the most elite judicial positions.139
Regional Government require quotas of twenty-five percent and thirty percent women
respectively in their legislatures. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW), Concluding Observations on the Combined Fourth to Sixth Periodic
Reports of Iraq, ¶¶ 33−34, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/IRQ/CO/4-6 (Mar. 10, 2014), available at
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CEDAW/
C/IRQ/CO/4-6&Lang=En [hereinafter Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination].
135. OECD, GOVERNMENT AT A GLANCE 2013, at 122−27 (2013), available at
http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/governance/government-at-a-glance-2013_gov_glance-2013en.
136. See EUR. COMM’N FOR THE EFFICIENCY OF JUSTICE, COUNCIL OF EUR., EVALUATION
REPORT ON EUROPEAN JUDICIAL SYSTEMS 147-50, 275-86 (2012) [hereinafter REP. ON EUR.
JUDICIAL SYSTEMS) available at http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/cepej/evaluation/
2012/Rapport_en.pdf (highlighting the achievements of several European Union judiciaries
in having proportionate numbers of women in their judiciaries).
137. The percentages break down as follows: Bosnia and Herzegovina: sixty-three
percent; Croatia: sixty-seven percent; Czech Republic: sixty-one percent; France: sixtyfour percent; Greece: sixty-five percent; Hungary: sixty-nine percent; Latvia: seventy-six
percent; Montenegro: fifty-five percent; Poland: sixty-three percent; Romania: seventythree percent; Slovakia: sixty-three percent; Slovenia: seventy-eight percent. See id. at
147–50, 275–81; see also GENDER AND JUDGING (Ulrike Schultz & Gisela Shaw eds., 2013)
(exploring the experiences of women judges in nineteen different countries).
138. Eyal Katvan, The Entry and Integration of Women into Judicial Positions in Israel,
in GENDER AND JUDGING, supra note 138, at 83.
139. See REP. ON EUR. JUDICIAL SYSTEMS, supra note 136, at 280 (observing that only
six European states have more than fifty percent women in positions of power such as court
presidents); OECD, supra note 135, at 124 (observing that women accounted for twentynine percent of court presidencies of trial and intermediate appellate courts in OECD states).
See generally GENDER AND JUDGING, supra note 137 (providing articles indicating that
women’s experience on the bench is most dominant in the lower levels of the judiciary and
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Some countries exhibit relative success in diversifying their
judiciaries to make them more representative of the population.
Women have comprised nearly fifty percent of law school classes in
the United States since 1992, yet they currently only occupy
approximately thirty-three percent of positions within the federal
judiciary;140 and only roughly twenty-three percent of U.S. federal
district court judges are minorities.141 Similarly, within the United
States, state courts experienced a range of gender diversity; despite
increases over time, recent data indicate women hold 29.2% of state
judicial positions.142 Minorities held approximately 12.6% of overall
state judicial positions in the United States.143 In Germany, women
account for approximately 59% of law graduates;144 and in 2012,
approximately 40% of national judges were women.145 Similarly, in
not in more elite positions in courts of last resort).
140. Women in the Federal Judiciary: Still a Long Way to Go, NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW
CTR. (June 27, 2014), http://www.nwlc.org/resource/women-federal-judiciary-still-longway-go-1; see also Jill D. Weingberg & Laura B. Nielsen, Examining Empathy:
Discrimination, Experience and Judicial Decisionmaking, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 313, 347–348
(2012). This is an improvement from 1977, when data suggested that women represented
1.4% and minorities represented 4.4% of the federal judiciary. Nancy Scherer, Diversifying
the Federal Bench: Is Universal Legitimacy for the U.S. Justice System Possible?, 105 NW.
U. L. REV. 587, 588 (2011).
141. Weingberg & Nielsen, supra note 140, at 347; see also Gregory L. Acquaviva &
John D. Castiglione, Judicial Diversity on State Supreme Courts, 39 SETON HALL L. REV.
1203, 1214, 1223 (2009).
142. The low was 5.6% in West Virginia and the high was 34.2% in Massachusetts.
143. Malia Reddick et al., Racial and Gender Diversity on State Courts: An AJS Study,
48 JUDGES J. 28 (2009). The states with the lowest proportion of minority candidates were
Maine, Montana, New Hampshire, Vermont, and Wyoming (0%), with a high of 65.1% in
Hawaii; the next states with the highest proportion of minority judges were Louisiana
(20.6%) and New York (20.5%). Id. Research exploring women’s variation in
representation in U.S. state courts also identified that the size of the court matters, and larger
courts are more likely to have more women. See Sally J. Kenny, Choosing Judges: A
Bumpy Road to Women’s Equality and a Long Way to Go, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1499,
1520−21 (2012); see also Margaret Williams, Women’s Representation on State Trial and
Appellate Courts, 88 SOC. SCI. Q. 1192, 1199 (2007).
FÜR
JUSTIZ
(Oct.
31,
2014),
144. Ausbildungsstatistik,
BUNDESAMT
https://www.bundesjustizamt.de/DE/SharedDocs/Publikationen/Justizstatistik/Juristenausbil
dung_2013.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2.

145. In Germany, thirty-one percent of the Federal Constitutional Court is comprised of
women. Zahl der Richter, Richterinnen, Staatanwälte, Staatanwältinnen und Vertreter,
Vertreterinnen des öffentlichen Interesses in der Rechtspflege der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland, BUNDESAMT FÜR JUSTIZ (Dec. 31, 2012), https://www.bundesjustizamt.
de/DE/SharedDocs/Publikationen/Justizstatistik/Gesamtstatistik.pdf?__blob=publicationFile
&v=5. Scholars have identified, however, that women within the German judiciary
“continue to be under-represented in leadership positions.” Ulrike Schultz, “I was noticed
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Canada, although women made up 51% of the Canadian population
and 40% of practicing lawyers, only about 33% of judges were
women. Canada, however, has had even weaker representation of
minorities, with minorities comprising only 2.3% of federally
appointed judges.146 This suggests that, although these states did not
exhibit perfect gender diversity, there were multiple instances where
national judiciaries had proportionately better diversity than
international arbitration. Nevertheless, given the difficulty of many
states in reaching representative levels of gender and race, achieving
diversity often requires long-term investments.
Other states’ judiciaries experienced gender imbalance, but
had better success than international arbitration. In 2010, women
made up approximately 36% of the judiciary in Venezuela, 35% in
Costa Rica, and 32% in Colombia.147 In Kenya, although women
lacked representation on the court of appeal, approximately 35.5% of
advocates were women and women made up about 30% of the bench
in 2010.148 Even in Indonesia, in 2011, 23.4% of trial judges and
15.4% of appellate judges were women.149
Some national judiciaries, however, experience lower levels
of diversity.150 In the United Kingdom, the Ministry of Justice
reported that, in 2010, the levels of women judges rose to 20.6%,

and I was asked . . .” Women’s Careers in the Judiciary: Results of an empirical study for
the Ministry of Justice in Northrhine-Westfalia, Germany, in GENDER AND JUDGING, supra
note 137, at 145.
146. Meredith Bacal, Diversity and the Judiciary: Who is the Bench Representing
Anyway?, THE COURT (July 5, 2012), http://www.thecourt.ca/2012/07/05/diversity-and-thejudiciary-who-is-the-bench-representing-anyway/ (citing Ryerson Univ. Diversity Inst.,
Improving Representation in the Judiciary: A Diversity Strategy (2012), available at
http://www.ryerson.ca/content/dam/diversity/resources/Powerpoint%20%20Improving%20Representation%20in%20the%20Judiciary%20-%20June%2027.pdf).
147. Sital Kalantry, Women in Robes, 6 AMERICAS Q. 83, 84 (2012).
148. Winifred Kamau, Women Judges and Magistrates in Kenya: Challenges,
Opportunities and Contributions, in GENDER AND JUDGING, supra note 137, at 167, 170, 181.
149. Engy Abdelkader, To Judge or Not to Judge: A Comparative Analysis of Islamic
Jurisprudential Approaches to Female Judges in the Muslim World (Indonesia, Egypt, and
Iran), 37 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 309, 347 (2014).
150. There may be other states with worse representation or states with no gender
diversity. Research on some Islamic law countries suggests this is the case. See id.
(observing that other Muslim countries lack diversity and some countries even forbid women
from serving as judges); Ulirke Schultz & Gisela Shaw, Introduction: Gender and Judging:
Overview and Synthesis, in GENDER AND JUDGING, supra note 137, at 1, 8–9 (observing that
Egypt, Kuwait, and the U.A.E. have female judges but noting that Saudi Arabia and Iran do
not).
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with only 4.8% minorities.151 In Brazil, in 2010, 18% of judges in its
highest court were women, which was an increase from 0% in
1999.152 In Malawi, approximately 17% of justices on the Malawi
High Court and Supreme Court of Appeal were women.153 In Japan,
the percentage of women in the judiciary was low (15%) but similar
to the proportion of female Japanese lawyers (16%).154 By contrast
to the success they experienced in their legislative representation,
only 6% of the Iraqi judiciary were women.155
The private sector also exhibited some success in putting
women in elite corporate positions with arguably better results than
international arbitration. In the United States, there is at least one
woman on ninety-seven percent of corporate boards.156
Acknowledging that “there is a consistent deficit between the gender
and ethnic diversity of mid-grade employees and their managerial
counterparts within any given business,”157 an Oxford Economics
Report observed that countries with the “highest female
representation on corporate boards [were] Norway (thirty-six
percent), followed by Philippines (twenty-three percent), Sweden
(twenty-three percent), Latvia (twenty-two percent) and Slovakia
(twenty-two percent).”158
151. Mary L. Clark, Judicial Retirement and Return to Practice, 60 CATH. U. L. REV.
841, 873 n.216 (2011). Recent data demonstrate low levels of women’s representation as, in
2013, 24.3% of judges were women and 4.8% were black or ethnic minorities. Diversity
Statistics and General Overview Breakdown 2013, CTS. & TRIBUNALS JUDICIARY (July 11,
2013), https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/ publications/diversity-statistics-and-general-overview2013 (click on “Tribunals Diversity Breakdown 2012–13”).
152. Kalantry, supra note 147, at 83.
153. Siri Gloppen & Fedelis E. Kanyongolo, Courts and the Poor in Malawi: Economic
Marginalization, Vulnerability and the Law, 5 INT’L J. CONST. L. 258, 289 (2007).
154. David T. Johnson, Japan’s Prosecution System, 41 CRIME & JUST. 35, 49 n.8
(2012).
155. See CEDAW, supra note 134, ¶¶ 33−34.
156. Nizan Geslevich Packin, It’s (Not) All About the Money: Using Behavioral
Economics to Improve Regulation of Risk Management in Financial Institutions, 15 U. PA. J.
BUS. L. 419, 454 n.184 (2013). However, women only make up sixteen percent of the total
number of directors and the average number of women on corporate boards is two. Id.
157. GLOBAL DIVERSITY REPORT, supra note 130, at 30.
158. Id. at 8; see also Kimberly Gladman, 2013 Women on Boards Survey, HARV. L.
SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (May 20, 2013),
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2013/05/20/2013-women-on-boards-survey
(noting
that “63% [of companies] have at least one female director” and “women make up a higher
percentage of directors in developed markets”); EUR. COMM’N, REPORT ON WOMEN AND MEN
IN LEADERSHIP POSITIONS AND GENDER EQUALITY STRATEGY MID-TERM REVIEW (Oct. 14,
2013), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-882_en.htm (identifying
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C. Less Relative Success with Diversity

International arbitration’s diversity levels may not be unusual.
First, as identified earlier, some national courts had little diversity.
Second, empirical literature reflects that men from developed states
have primarily populated international courts and tribunals.
In terms of gender diversity, one study estimated women
accounted for only about five percent of appointments in
international courts and tribunals.159
Grossman’s more
comprehensive study identified slightly higher proportions in 2012.
With only one outlier,160 women historically comprised
approximately twenty percent of international courts and tribunals.
Grossman’s 2012 article identified that women made up nineteen
percent of the World Trade Organization’s Appellate Body; women
comprised eighteen percent of judges on the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda and the European Court of Human Rights; the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and
African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights had fifteen percent
women; the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) had
thirteen percent; the European Court of Justice had seven percent; the
International Court of Justice had three percent; and the International
that within the E.U. women accounted for 16.6%, or one in six, board members of the largest
publicly listed company, including Finland (29.1%) and Latvia (29%), closely followed by
France (26.8%) and Sweden (26.5%)). This is, however, not necessarily a natural
phenomenon as several European countries have gender quotas for corporate boards. See
generally FIRMS, BOARDS AND GENDER QUOTAS: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES (Fredrik
Englestad & Mari Teigen eds., 2012). But see Justice: Board Members, EUR. COMM’N (Jan.
20, 2015), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/gender-decision-making/database/
business-finance/supervisory-board-board-directors/index_en.htm (identifying that, for the
European Union, twenty percent of board members of the largest publicly listed companies
were women).
159. See Chiara Giorgetti, Who Decides Who Decides in International Investment
Arbitration, 35 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 431, 459 n.99 (2014) (citing LCHR’s Chart Showing
Gender and Regional Balance in Elections to International Courts and Tribunals, LAWYERS
COMM. FOR HUM. RTS., available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/
pdf/judges_gender_region_040303.pdf (last visited May 16, 2015)).
160. The International Criminal Court was the one exception, with forty-four percent
women. Grossman, Sex on the Bench, supra note 112, at 652−54, 679–81. Notably, the
Rome Statute requires equitable geographical and gender representation. Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court art. 36(8), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 38544, available at
http://legal.un.org/icc/statute/romefra.htm; but see Current Judges, INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT, http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/structure%20of%20the%20court/
chambers/the%20judges/Pages/judges.aspx (last visited May 27, 2015) (identifying that, in
2015, six of seventeen judges of the International Criminal Court are women but that a
woman is the President of the Court).
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Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) had never had a woman as a
permanent judge at the time of the research, though it now has one.161
Beyond Grossman’s historical research, the Iran-U.S. Claims
Tribunal (IUSCT) at The Hague has nine members, and currently
only one is a woman.162 In 2013, our research only identified one
other woman—Gabrielle Kirk McDonald—serving on the IUSCT
since its inception in 1981. Only one of the seven members of the
World Trade Organization (WTO) Appellate Body,163 and only one
member of the twenty-member ITLOS164 was a woman. The IACHR
currently has no women judges.165 We identified only one woman
who served as a commissioner on the United Nations Claims
Commission (UNCC).166
Research by Cecily Rose and Shashank Kumar confirms a
lack of female counsel in public international law. They identified
that for all lawyers involved in contentious cases at the International
Court of Justice (ICJ), female counsel only represented 11.2% of all
advocates (n=23), and only spoke 7.4% of the total time in ICJ
proceedings.167 For the subset of lawyers who were repeat ICJ
counsel, women only represented 6.3% (n=4) of the pool, and
women’s speaking time decreased to 2.9%.168 One contrast was that,
in advisory proceedings, female advocates accounted for 19% of the
population and 18% of total speaking time, but these women tended

161. Grossman, Sex on the Bench, supra note 112, at 679–80; see also infra note 164.
162. See IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS TRIBUNAL, Arbitrators, https://www.iusct.net/Pages/Public/
A-Arbitrators.aspx (last visited May 16, 2015) (listing Rosemary Barkett as the only female
member on the Tribunal). Gabrielle Kirk, a U.S. appointee, was the only other woman.
163. Yuejiao Zhang is the current Chinese appointee. Former female Appellate Body
members include Merit Janow (U.S.), Jennifer Hillman (U.S.) and Lilia Bautista
(Philippines). Biography, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/
dispu_e/ab_members_bio_e.htm (last visited May 16, 2015).
164. See Grossman, supra note 110, at Table 1; see also Members, INT’L TRIBUNAL FOR
LAW OF THE SEA, https://www.itlos.org/index.php?id=96 (last visited May 16, 2015)
(listing Elsa Kelly as the only female on the Tribunal).

THE

165. Grossman, supra note 110, at Table 2.
166. Professor Dr. Nayla Comair-Obeid was the sole female Commissioner. See Report
and Recommendations Made by the Panel of Comm’rs Concerning the Fourth Instalment of
Palestinian “Late Claims” for Damages Up to USD 100,000 (Category “C” Claims), U.N.
Comp. Comm’n Governing Council, U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/2005/3 (Mar. 10, 2005), available
at http://www.uncc.ch/sites/default/files/attachments/documents/r2005-03.pdf (showing a
signature by “N. Comair-Obeid”).
167. Kumar & Rose, supra note 60, at 904.
168. Id. at 904.
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to be government officials and state diplomats,169 suggesting that
having a healthy proportion of women in key domestic positions
could generate a trickle-down effect on diversity in international law.
International courts and tribunals also experience diversity
challenges related to nationality and development. One study
commented on “the extent of the Western monopoly of international
legal practice at the ICJ” and argued that international law “is not as
international as its name implies.”170 Gaubatz and MacArthur
questioned the legitimacy of the ICJ given the lack of diversity in the
judiciary and counsel. For judges, their 2002 data indicated that all
seven of the OECD judges received their education entirely in OECD
states, and all but one of the non-OECD judges received the majority
of their legal education in OECD states.171 Although the ICJ has
arguably done better in recent history, 172 the data were in contrast to
the Statute of the ICJ which requires electors to “bear in mind not
only that the persons to be elected should individually possess the
qualifications required, but also that in the body as a whole the
representation of the main forms of civilization and of the principal
legal systems of the world should be assured.”173
169. Id. at 914.
170. Gaubatz & MacArthur, supra note 97, at 240–41.
171. Id. at 261−63.
172. As of July 2014, the judges of the ICJ were nationals of Brazil, China, France,
India, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand, Russia, Slovakia, Somalia, Uganda, the
United States, and the United Kingdom. See Current Members, INT’L COURT OF JUSTICE,
http://www.icj-cij.org/court/index.php?p1=1&p2=2&p3=1 (last visited July 31, 2014).
173. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 9, June 26, 1945, 33 U.N.T.S. 993,
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/?p1=4&p2=2. The ITLOS has a similar
mandate requiring “representation of the principal legal systems of the world and equitable
geographical distribution . . . .” It also states that “[t]here shall be no fewer than three
members from each geographical group as established by the General Assembly of the
United Nations.” Statute of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea arts. 2(2), 3(2),
Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 561, available at http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_
agreements/texts/unclos/annex6.htm. Notably, the ITLOS does not mandate gender
representation. Compare id., with supra note 160 and accompanying text (requiring gender
and geographical balance at the International Criminal Court). Although the ITLOS has low
gender representation it arguably does better on the matrix of nationality. As of July 2014,
the judges of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea were nationals of Algeria,
Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Cape Verde, China, France, Germany, Grenada, India, Japan,
Lebanon, Malta, Poland, South Korea, Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, and Ukraine. See
Members, INT’L TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA, https://www.itlos.org/en/thetribunal/members/ (last visited July 31, 2014); see also Jacob Katz Cogan, Representation
and Power in International Organization: The Operational Constitution and its Critics, 103
AM. J. INT’L L. 209, 220–24 (2009) (suggesting that mandates requiring diversity in
international law are limited, but there are hortatory suggestions for representation and
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Gaubatz and MacArthur also identified a dearth of
developing-world advocates.174 New research by Rose and Kumar
replicates those earlier findings with more recent data. From
1999−2012, the majority of the 205 different lawyers appearing
before the ICJ were from the developed world. Specifically, 72.2%
were nationals of OECD states, 71.5% were from states the World
Bank classified as High Income, and 72.9% were from states with
HDI scores that put them in the category of “very high human
development”; for counsel who were repeat players at the ICJ, the
balance was even more skewed towards representation by lawyers
from developed states.175
The private sector also has its challenges with diversity.
When power is concentrated into a single position, gender balance is
not as prevalent. For example, the Fortune 500 announced in 2014
that women exhibited their best showing in history by comprising
4.8% of CEOs in the top 500 corporations in the United States.176 In
contrast, when membership is more diffuse—such as when there are
multiple positions on a corporate board—there is broader female
representation, as 63% of top corporations have at least one female
board member.177 This latter phenomenon might reflect the tendency
for larger structures to generate greater opportunities for diversity.
balance).
174. Gaubatz & MacArthur, supra note 97, at 247, 251−53.
175. Kumar & Rose, supra note 60, at 902–06; but see TERRIS ET AL., supra note 2, at
223 (concluding that “[t]here was once a time when the ‘invisible college’ of international
judges consisted of a small band of men, principally Europeans, clustered tightly in The
Hague” but observing that “[t]oday’s more extensive network has much more diversity in
terms of geography, race, and gender”).
176. Caroline Fairchild, Number of Fortune 500 Women CEOs Reaches Historic High,
FORTUNE (June 3, 2014, 6:00 AM), http://fortune.com/2014/06/03/number-of-fortune-500women-ceos-reaches-historic-high/. The European Union exhibited similar difficulties with
less than three percent of the largest listed companies having a female CEO. EURO.
COMM’N, GENDER BALANCE ON CORPORATE BOARDS: EUROPE IS CRACKING THE GLASS
CEILING
2
(Mar.
2014),
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/genderequality/files/documents/140303_factsheet_wob_en.pdf.
177. Gladman, supra note 158 (“63% [of companies] have at least one female director,
and 13% have at least three women”). Even with this success, the popular press notes that
those women CEOs are still likely to be paid less than their male counterparts and more
likely to be fired. See Edward Helmore, The Facts Show It: Female CEOs are More Likely
Than Men to be Fired, GUARDIAN, May 17, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/
may/17/female-ceos-more-likely-than-men-to-be-fired; Claire Cain Miller, An Elusive
Jackpot: Riches Come to Women as C.E.O.s, but Few Get There, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/08/business/riches-come-to-women-as-ceos-but-few-getthere.html?_r=1 (observing that women CEOs make $1.6 million less than male
counterparts).
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Researchers observed this phenomenon in U.S. state courts whereby
larger state courts exhibited larger proportions of women.178
Meanwhile, law firms have also struggled with diversity. In
2014, Linklaters reported that, globally, only 17% of its partners
were female, with a high of 28% female partners in Asia and a low of
7% female partners in Europe; 88.37% of U.S. partners were
Caucasian.179 Linklaters’ experience is not unique given the lack of
women partners in U.S. and U.K. law firms.180 These examples raise
the possibility that the diversity data in arbitration reflect an
international pipeline problem, as not all countries have the same
level of women or minority lawyers (to say nothing of women and
minority lawyers who are interested in international arbitration).181
It is worth observing that—by comparison to many national
judiciaries and legislatures—international courts and tribunals
experience challenges about their representativeness, generating
concerns about their institutional legitimacy. The question remains
as to whether the international arbitration community wishes to be a
leader in the diversity amongst the international law community or is
content with its current position.
D. Self-Reflection on the “Invisible College’s” Perceived Diversity Levels

Regardless of the appropriate comparative baseline for
international arbitration, the data reflected that there were concerns
about diversity challenges within the international arbitration
community.182 To explore issues about diversity from a broad
178. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
179. LINKLATERS, DIVERSITY STATISTICS: 2014, at 1, 6 (2014), http://www.linklaters.
com/Responsibility/Pages/Diversity.aspx.
180. See AM. BAR ASS’N, A CURRENT GLANCE AT WOMEN IN THE LAW 2 (Feb. 2013),
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/marketing/women/current_glance
_statistics_feb2013.authcheckdam.pdf (indicating that women make up 19.9% of partners in
the United States); Joanne Harris, Diversity Efforts Fail to Pay Off at Top End of Profession,
LAW. (Aug. 5, 2013), available at http://www.thelawyer.com/analysis/the-lawyermanagement/management-news/diversity-efforts-fail-to-pay-off-at-top-end-of-profession
/3008182.article (observing that the Lawyer’s UK 200 showed that women made up 18.6%
of all partners).
181. See also Sally J. Kenny, Which Judicial Selection Systems Generate the Most
Women Judges? Lessons from the United States, in GENDER AND JUDGING, supra note 137,
at 461, 462–69 (identifying various explanations for poor female representation in
judiciaries).
182. Arbitration’s diversity concerns are somewhat reminiscent of commentary about
the glass ceiling in transitioning to the judiciary. See Kalantry, supra note 147, at 85
(“Across the globe, women judges report that an ‘old boys’ club’ mentality surround[s]
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perspective, we asked a wide-ranging question. Specifically, we
asked subjects to respond to the following statement: “International
arbitration has diversity challenges related to gender, nationality, or
age.”183 Subjects then ranked their answer using a 1−5 numerical
scale, with “1” being “strongly disagree,” “3” being “neither agree
nor disagree,” and “5” being “strongly agree.”184
Overall, the responses reflected that ICCA subjects selfidentified diversity issues in international arbitration. For the 513
ICCA subjects responding to the question, both the most frequent
answer and median answer was “4”,185 indicating that subjects
somewhat agreed that there are diversity challenges in international
arbitration related to gender, nationality or age.186
Table 6: Percentages and Frequency of Responses of all ICCA Subjects in
Response to Question about whether International Arbitration has Diversity
Issues related to Gender, Nationality, or Age.
Response Type

Response
Percentage

Frequency

1 Strongly Disagree

6.2

32

2 Somewhat Disagree

9.2

47

3 Neither Agree nor Disagree

27.1

139

4 Somewhat Agree

30.8

159

5 Strongly Agree

26.7

137

100.0

513

Total

judicial appointment [and] poses a crucial barrier to entry . . . .”).
183. See infra Annex 1.
184. Id.
185. Thirty-five subjects failed to respond to this question. The mean response was 3.63
(SD=1.153).
186. See Table 6. For the subset of ICCA subjects who had served as counsel or
arbitrator, the 445 subjects had nearly identical response patterns, with 6.3% strongly
disagreeing (n=28), 10.3% somewhat disagreeing (n=46), 26.5% neither agreeing nor
disagreeing (n=118), (4) 30.1% somewhat agreeing (n=134), and (5) 26.7% strongly
agreeing (n=119) about international arbitration experiencing diversity concerns.
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We analyzed whether there were meaningful differences in
how men and women evaluated diversity-related concerns. A t-test
revealed a meaningful gender difference in the mean response to the
diversity question (t(506)=-6.189; p<.001; r=.27; n=508).187 For
male subjects, the mean score was 3.46 (SD=1.13; n=385). In
contrast, for female subjects the mean score was 4.17 (SD=1.05;
n=123), indicating that the majority of women believed there was a
problem and identified that they “somewhat agreed” to “strongly
agreed” with the possibility of diversity challenges related to gender,
nationality, or age. In addition, the r-value reflected a medium-sized
difference, suggesting the gender variation was non-trivial.
Figure 1 reflects that men were more likely than women to
either disagree with the idea that there are diversity challenges or not
take a position on diversity challenges. By contrast, women were
more likely than men to “strongly agree” that international arbitration
experiences diversity challenges, with fifty percent of all women
selecting that response.
Figure 1: Percentage of all ICCA Subjects identifying diversity challenges as
a function of subject gender

We computed a correlation coefficient to evaluate a possible
linear relationship between age and subject response. The results
demonstrated a significant relationship between subject age and
187. The effect was also significant for the subset of ICCA participants who were
counsel and/or arbitrators (t(443)=-5.736; p<.001; r=.26; n=445).
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subject response (r(497)=-.17; p<.001). The direction of the
relationship was such that, as subject age increased, subjects were
less likely to identify a diversity problem in international arbitration.
In contrast, as subject age decreased, subjects were more likely to
identify a diversity problem in international arbitration.
The results evaluating the relationship between a subject’s
development status and response were more mixed. While one might
hypothesize that, much like gender and age where women and
younger practitioners were more sensitized to issues of diversity, this
was not the case for subjects’ development status. The results,
however, suggested that subjects’ development status was either
irrelevant or operated in the opposite direction of that stated
hypothesis.
We also analyzed subjects’ primary nationality in three ways,
namely: (1) OECD membership; (2) World Bank classification; and
(3) HDI classification. The results generated a puzzle, as two
measures failed to identify a reliable link between development status
and responses to the diversity question, but one measure of
development status revealed an unexpected result.
First, an ANOVA188 was unable to identify a meaningful
group difference in response to the diversity question for subjects’
World Bank status (F(3,480)=1.802; p=.15; r=.11; n=484). Followup analyses using a conservative test also failed to identify any
significant pairwise comparisons. A more liberal follow-up test,
however, identified a latent relationship where nationals of uppermiddle income states expressed lower levels of concerns about
diversity, whereas nationals of High Income states expressed higher
level of concerns about diversity.
Second, correlation coefficients189 analyzed response
variations to the diversity question and the continuous variable of
subject’s HDI (r(484)=.07; p=.15). The facial, but non-significant,
trend was that subjects who were nationals of more developed states
expressed greater concern about lack of diversity. As any latent
effect was less than statistically small (r<.10), there is a theoretical
but unlikely risk of insufficient power.190 In any event, a priori
188. The one-way ANOVA was necessary to analyze variation in the diversity question
on the basis of the four-category variable of subjects’ World Bank development status. See
URDAN, supra note 71, at 105−10.
189. A Pearson’s Product Moment Correlation Co-efficient explores linear relationships
between two continuous variables. Id. at 79−83.
190. See JACOB COHEN ET AL., STATISTICAL POWER ANALYSIS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL
SCIENCES 3–6, 115 (2d ed. 1988) (explaining a priori power analyses); Franck, Development
and Outcomes, supra note 28, at 461 n.132 (applying Cohen’s power analysis to arbitration).
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power analyses reflect that it is impossible to reliably conclude the
lack of an effect until there is data from over 781 subjects; further
research is therefore required.
Third, a t-test191 revealed a meaningful difference in the mean
response to the diversity question (t(482)=-2.255; p=.03; r=.10;
n=484) for OECD and non-OECD subjects. The difference was in an
unexpected direction. Subjects from OECD countries were more
likely to identify diversity issues (M=3.69; SD=1.14; n=362). In
contrast, subjects from non-OECD countries were less likely to
identify diversity challenges (M=3.42; SD=1.16; n=112). The effect
size was statistically small (r=.10), which indicates that the reliably
present effect was not large.192 Figure 2 reflects that non-OECD
nationals were slightly more likely than OECD nationals to either
disagree with the idea that there are diversity challenges or not take a
position. By contrast, OECD nationals were more likely than nonOECD nationals to either somewhat or “strongly agree” that
international arbitration experiences diversity challenges.

The post hoc power of an analysis is determined using power tables to estimate the
probability of committing a Type II error (Type II error rate = 1 – power). As the power of
the analysis was small (r ≤ .10 and n= 144), there is a seventy to eighty percent risk of
having incorrectly identified no relationship. When there is less than a “small” nonsignificant effect, social science literature does not generally perceive a power problem.
191. As OECD status is a two-level variable, a t-test is necessary. See URDAN, supra
note 71, at 93.
192. The effect was also significant and small for the subset of ICCA subjects who were
counsel and/or arbitrators (t(482)=-2.255; p=.03; r=.10; n=484).
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Figure 2: Percentage of all ICCA subjects identifying diversity challenges as a
function of subject’s OECD status

In these circumstances, it is possible that non-OECD
nationals perceived international arbitration as comparatively better
at promoting diversity and thereby evaluated the status quo as less
problematic. It may also reflect that individuals from developing
countries may have different approaches to social norms related to
diversity.193 Irrespective of potential competing causal explanations,
there is value in identifying the phenomenon. The observation also
suggests it is appropriate to acknowledge addressing diversity
concerns transnationally requires a nuanced approach, where
approaches to diversity that are appropriate in a national context may
not apply transnationally.
Overall, the international arbitration community indicated that
there were concerns on issues of diversity related to gender,
nationality, or age. Women and younger participants reliably
identified the difference more distinctly. Although the results were
mixed, there was some evidence suggesting that the arbitration
community from the developed world may perceive greater concerns
193. See, e.g., Ronald Inglehart & Wayne E. Baker, Modernization, Culture Change,
and the Persistence of Traditional Values, 54 AM. SOC. REV. 1 (2000) (identifying how
cultural values can vary according to economic development levels); Yiming Jing & Michael
Harris Bond, Linking a Citizen’s Trust of Regulatory Institutions and Out-groups to
Tolerance for Morally Questionable Practices: The Role of National Context for Child
Socialization (forthcoming) (copy on file with authors) (discussing cultural variations to
sensitive social issues and exploring variations related to economic development).
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than developing world counterparts. As demonstrated with subjects’
actual experiences with diversity, these perceptions may require
reassessment.194
V. EXPERIENCED DIVERSITY PROBLEMS
Perception can be different than reality. Scholarship in
cognitive psychology reflects that assessments can be influenced by
heuristics that make certain experiences seem more prevalent or
generate selective perception.195
For this reason, we tested
demographic data and perceptions against reported experiences in
international arbitration.
This subsection first analyzes how frequently those acting as
arbitrators receive appointments, both as a function of gender and
development status. It then explores counsels’ and arbitrators’
experience with diverse appointments. To minimize response bias,
we asked about subjects’ experiences with international arbitration in
a portion of the Survey that was separate from the demographic
questions and the survey item about diversity. Specifically, we asked
questions to identify—in their experience as arbitrator and counsel—
how frequently subjects had worked with tribunals comprised of at
least one woman and/or tribunals with at least one developing
country arbitrator.196
A. Gender and Development: Variations in Frequency of Appointments

Tables 1 and 2 reflected that the average number of
appointments per arbitrator for all types of arbitration was thirty-five;
and given the variation in the number of appointments, the median
number of total arbitration appointments per arbitrator (both in ICA
and ITA) was ten. The question remained whether the scope of those
appointments varied according to arbitrators’ gender or development
status. For women, it was not possible to identify a meaningful
194. The data reflected a reliable pattern whereby developing world arbitrators
experienced lower numbers of appointments than their developed world counterparts, but
were also likely to sit with other developing world arbitrators. We were unable to identify a
meaningful difference between the appointment levels of men and women.
195. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER CHABRIS & DANIEL SIMONS, THE INVISIBLE GORILLA: HOW
OUR INTUITIONS DECEIVE US (2010); FRANCK, supra note 29, at ch. 2.
196. Methodological constraints related to timing and formatting prevented us from
asking questions beyond those identified in Annex 1. Further research could more precisely
explore subjects’ experiences.
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difference in number of arbitral appointments; but for nationals of
developing countries, it was possible to identify a meaningful
difference in the number of appointments.
For gender, we conducted two types of tests to assess
meaningful differences between men and women in the number of
arbitration appointments. First, a Mann-Whitney two-sample Utest197 failed to reveal a statistically significant difference in the
median number of appointments (U=4564.5; p=.39). The median
number of appointments for women was nine (IQR=3-22);198 and the
median for men was ten and a half (IQR=3-40).199 When analyzing
subsets of ICA and ITA arbitrators, we were also unable to find a
reliable gender difference in appointment levels.200
For development status, we conducted multiple tests—using
different definitions of development status—to explore potential
differences in the appointment levels of developed and developing
world arbitrators.201 First, a Mann-Whitney U-test202 identified a
reliable difference in appointments between OECD and non-OECD
nationals (U=3247.5; p<.01) such that OECD nationals reliably
obtained more appointments.
While the median number of
appointments for arbitrators from non-OECD countries was 5
(IQR=2-19.25), the median number of appointments for arbitrators
from OECD countries was 11.5 (IQR 4-40). Second, a Kruskal197. When exploring group differences in a binary variable (like gender), it is
appropriate to use a Mann-Whitney test when means are skewed. GREGORY W. CORDER &
DALE I. FOREMAN, NONPARAMETRIC STATISTICS FOR NON-STATISTICIANS: A STEP-BY-STEP
APPROACH (2009); URDAN, supra note 71, at 96, 161.
198. The range of an IQR reflects the quartile breakdown. In this case the twenty-fifth
quartile is three; the median was nine; and the seventy-fifth percentile was twenty-two. For
IQR=3–22, the three reflects the twenty-fifth quartile and the twenty-two reflects the
seventy-fifth quartile.
199. Out of an abundance of caution, even though the data was skewed, we also used a
t-test to explore potential gender differences in appointment levels. The test also failed to
reveal any mean difference in appointment levels for men and women (t(260)=0.293; p=.77;
r=.02; n=262). The mean number of appointments for women was thirty-two (SD=79.39;
n=46), and the mean number of appointments for men was thirty-five (SD=61; n=216).
200. Mann-Whitney tests were unable to detect a reliable link between gender and
arbitration appointments in either ICA (U=4511.5; p=.48) or ITA (U=3020.5; p=.23).
201. Different tests were necessary because of the different variable types. A MannWhitney test compares differences between two groups and a continuous variable; a
Kruskal-Wallis test compares differences between multiple groups and a continuous
variable; and correlations are used when there are two continuous variables, like HDI status
and number of appointments.
202. See supra note 197 (noting Mann-Whitney tests are appropriate for binary
variables, like OECD status).
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Wallis test203 identified a reliable difference between World Bank
classifications of an arbitrator’s home state (χ2=12.091; p<.01; r=.22;
n=250) such that developing world arbitrators obtained fewer
appointments than their developed country colleagues. Specifically,
the median number of appointments for an arbitrator from a High
Income state was 11 (IQR=4-40); the median number of
appointments for arbitrators from an Upper-middle Income state was
8 (IQR=2-25); and the median number of appointments for
arbitrators from a Lower-middle Income state was 2 (IQR=1-8).
There were no arbitrators from Low Income states. Third, a
correlation coefficient204 identified a reliable difference between HDI
classifications of an arbitrator’s home state and the number of
appointments (r(250)=.13; p=.04). The direction was such that, the
more developed the home state, the greater number of appointments;
and the less developed the arbitrator’s home state, the fewer the
number of appointments.
Overall, the results suggested that, for women, once they
become arbitrators by having at least one appointment, the frequency
of appointments was roughly equivalent to those of men. By
contrast, for developing world arbitrators, the number of their
appointments was statistically lower than their developed world
counterparts; and the effect sizes suggest development status
generates a small-to-medium sized effect on the number of reported
arbitral appointments.
This generates a puzzle. It means that women were more
likely to perceive real diversity challenges; and the difficulty was
apparent when examining the small number of women acting as
arbitrators (particularly when compared to women in positions of
authority in national courts and legislatures). Nevertheless, once
women joined the arbitrator pool, they obtained roughly equivalent
levels of appointments. The diversity challenge for women appears
to relate to obtaining initial access or breaking through the “glass
ceiling.” For developing world arbitrators, it means they were less
likely to perceive diversity challenges, even though there were small
numbers of developing world arbitrators and they received fewer
appointments. Part of the explanation may be the contrast with the
arguably worse representation of developing world adjudicators in
international courts and tribunals, which is buttressed by the number
203. A Kruskal-Wallis test analyzes non-normal continuous variables (like appointment
levels) and group differences in a multi-categorical variable (like World Bank
classifications). CORDER & FOREMAN, supra note 196; URDAN, supra note 71, at 161.
204. See supra notes 189, 201 and accompanying text (noting correlations are
appropriate for continuous variables).
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of tribunals where developing world arbitrators sat with other
developing world arbitrators. Nevertheless, in contrast to the
diversity challenges experienced by women, it suggests that
developing world arbitrators may require a different solution to
achieve broader representation in the pool of arbitrators.
B. Arbitrators’ Experiences with Diversity

We asked subjects whether, in their experience as arbitrators,
they had served on a tribunal with a woman (or another woman). We
then invited subjects to respond by ticking a box indicating that they
had: (1) never sat on a tribunal with a woman; (2) they had sat on
such a tribunal one to five times; (3) they had sat on such a tribunal
six to ten times; or (4) they had sat on a tribunal with a woman more
than ten times.205
First, we adjusted responses to reflect women’s self-reported
arbitral appointments; there were many instances where women who
had served on tribunals but failed to identify their own service as
arbitrators in their answers.206 This made it possible to correct for
potential under-reporting. The mode and median response was 2,
reflecting that most arbitrators experienced at least 1 to 5 arbitrations
containing at least one woman. Table 7 provides a frequency
breakdown of subject responses, which indicate a significant
proportion of arbitrators reported they had “never” been on a tribunal
with a woman and more than 75% of arbitrators indicated the
maximum number of times they had sat on a tribunal with a female
co-arbitrator was 5. A primary basis for the presence of a female
arbitrator on a tribunal resulted from ensuring that women’s own
appointment experiences were reflected in the analysis.207

205. See infra Annex 1.
206. For example, if a woman had indicated that she had “never” (=1) sat on a tribunal
with a woman, but she sat on twenty cases, the response was re-coded as “more than ten
times” (=4) to reflect her own appointments.
207. Without adjusting for a woman’s own appointments, there was nearly a dead heat
between subjects answering they had “never” or only “1–5 times” sat with a woman. Those
two categories garnered nearly eighty-four percent of all responses. Only 7.8% of subjects
indicated they had sat with a woman more than ten times. The only reason for the variation
between those responses and the responses reported in Table 7 was that, for those subjects
who were female arbitrators, it was necessary to ensure that their own experience as
arbitrators were included in the systemic responses.
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Table 7: Percentages and Frequency of Responses of ICCA Subjects Serving
as Arbitrators, Describing the Frequency of Having at Least One Woman on a
Tribunal (including Women’s Self-Reported Appointments)
Response Type

Response
Percentage

Frequency

No Tribunal with a Woman

32.2

83

1-5 Tribunals with a Woman

43.4

112

6-10 Tribunals with a Woman

8.9

23

10+ Tribunals with a Woman

15.5

40

100.0

258

Total

Second, using the subset of 46 female arbitrators, we
identified how many times women worked on tribunals containing
two or more women. The results suggested that, more often than not,
these women were the only women on their tribunals. Specifically,
52.2% (n=24) indicated they had never sat with another woman; 37%
(n=17) indicated they had sat with another woman 1-5 times; and
1.5% (n=4) indicated they had sat with another woman between 6-10
times. Only one female arbitrator indicated that she had been
empaneled with another woman on more than ten occasions. Since
many international arbitration tribunals consist of three members, the
rarity for multiple women to serve as co-arbitrators was noteworthy.
Turning to nationality and variation in development
background, we asked whether arbitrators had served on tribunals
with an arbitrator from a developing country.208 We then invited
subjects to respond by ticking a box indicating that they had: (1)
never sat on such a tribunal; (2) sat on such a tribunal one to five
times; (3) sat on such a tribunal six to ten times; or (4) sat on a
tribunal with a developing world arbitrator more than ten times.209
We cross-checked a subject’s own development status to ensure that
their responses did not ignore their own experience in being
appointed to tribunals, although we recognize that respondents could
encounter difficulties in their self-definitions of development status.
We classified arbitrators’ development status using OECD, World
208. As identified earlier, there is no uniform definition of a “developing” nation.
Subjects answering this question may have experienced difficulties when reflecting on their
own experiences and generated non-uniform responses. Survey responses were, however,
buttressed by the demographic data showing similar homogeneities.
209. See infra Annex 1.
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Bank, and HDI status. Results were nearly identical irrespective of
how the subjects’ development status was coded.210 Table 8 provides
a frequency distribution of the OECD status results where we ensured
that, for nationals of non-OECD states, they did not under-represent
their experiences with developing world arbitrators by ignoring their
own experience as an arbitrator.
Table 8: Percentages and Frequency of Responses of ICCA Subjects Serving
as Arbitrators, Describing the Frequency of Having at Least One Developing
World Arbitrator on a Tribunal (including Subjects’ Self-Reported
Appointments using their OECD Status)
Response Type

Response
Percentage

Frequency

No Tribunal with a Developing World
Arbitrator

40.2

102

1-5 Tribunals with a Developing
World Arbitrator

38.6

98

6-10 tribunals with a Developing
World Arbitrator

9.8

25

10+ tribunals with a Developing
World Arbitrator

11.4

29

Total

100

254

Like the results for arbitrators experiencing the presence of a
single woman, nearly one-half of arbitrators had never had an
opportunity to collaborate with a developing world arbitrator on a
tribunal. Looking to the mean appointments of 35 and median of 10,
the data suggests that, at best, a developing world arbitrator sat on
one half to perhaps one third of tribunals. There were fourteen
210. When analyzing subjects using the World Bank classification of their home state
(and classifying non-High Income arbitrators as “developing world” arbitrators): (1) 40.2%
(n=102) had never sat with a developing country arbitrator; (2) 38.6% (n=98) had sat with
one developing world arbitrator 1–5 times; (3) 9.8% (n=25) had sat with a developing world
arbitrator 6–10 times; and (4) 11.4% (n=29) had sat with a developing world arbitration
eleven or more times. When subjects were analyzed using their home state’s HDI score (and
classifying arbitrators as “developing” when they were not in the top thirty most developed
states): (1) 39.0% (n=99) had never sat with a developing country arbitrator; (2) 39.4%
(n=100) had sat with one developing world arbitrator 1–5 times; (3) 9.8% (n=25) had sat
with a developing world arbitrator 6–10 times; and (4) 11.8% (n=30) had sat with a
developing world arbitration eleven or more times.
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subjects who indicated that they had sat on 100+ arbitrations, but had
sat with developing world arbitrators in less than 10 cases. With a
broad pool of talent in international arbitration extending across
national borders and encompassing all genders, the concentration of
arbitration appointments suggests that there may be untapped value
in diversifying the pool of arbitrators.
C. Counsel’s Experiences with Diversity

For those who had acted as counsel, we asked two questions
regarding their experiences. The first question related to how
frequently subjects had tribunals with multiple female arbitrators and
the second question related to how frequently subjects had arbitral
tribunals with multiple arbitrators from the developing world.
In the first question, the mode and median answers were
“never,” and the vast majority of counsel had never argued before a
tribunal with multiple women. Specifically, 74.6% (n=290) of
counsel had never had a tribunal with multiple women; 21.3% (n=83)
of subjects had only experienced a tribunal with multiple women 1-5
times; 1.8% (n=7) of counsel experience tribunals with multiple
women 6-10 times; and the remaining 2.3% (n=9) had acted in more
than ten cases where there were multiple women. The light gray bar
in Figure 3 provides a frequency breakdown demonstrating that the
majority of counsel had never had more than one woman on a
tribunal at a time; and only a sliver (less than 5%) had experienced
two or more female arbitrators in more than five cases. Contrasted
with Table 1, where those serving as counsel had served in an
average of 27 cases, the lack of experience with tribunals containing
multiple female arbitrators is noteworthy. It suggests perceptions of
diversity imbalance in international arbitration were justified.
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Figure 3: Frequency of Counsel’s Experience with Diverse Tribunals

On the theory that female counsel might advise appointment
of female arbitrators—or that clients willing to retain female counsel
may be likely to appoint female arbitrators—we explored whether
counsel’s gender was linked to the number of tribunals with multiple
female arbitrators. Using a t-test, we were unable to detect a reliable
link between mean subject response and gender (t(387)=0.957;
p=.34; r=.05; n=389). Although a priori power analysis indicates a

sample of over 780 subjects could reliably isolate an effect, the nonsignificant latent effect was less than statistically small.211
For counsel’s experience with developing world arbitrators,
the results were similar but with a small twist. The mode and median
answer were “never”, meaning the majority of counsel had never
argued before a tribunal with two or more individuals from
211. The r-values were less than 0.10, which means they were less than statistically
small. COHEN ET AL., supra note 190, at 24–26, 115; COHEN ET AL., RESEARCH METHODS IN
EDUCATION, supra note 73 and accompanying text; see also URDAN, supra note 71, at 68–71.
A post-hoc power analysis indicates that to reliably detect the latent effect for gender, the
minimum sample size would need to be 781 to establish .80 power (20% risk of a Type II
error) and 1045 to establish .90 power (10% risk of a Type II error).
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developing countries. Specifically, 59.4% (n=228) of counsel had
never had a tribunal with two or more developing world arbitrators;
31.0% (n=119) only experienced a tribunal with multiple developing
country arbitrators 1-5 times; 4.2% (n=16) of counsel experience
tribunals with multiple developing country arbitrators 6-10 times; and
the remaining 5.5% (n=21) had acted in more than ten cases where
there were multiple arbitrators from the developing world. The dark
gray bar in Figure 3 provides a frequency breakdown demonstrating
that, when acting as counsel, the majority of subjects had never had
multiple developing world arbitrators on a tribunal; but a small
number (less than 10%) experienced two or more developing world
arbitrators in more than five cases.
Of note, in response to this question, one subject offered an
unsolicited comment: “when you do Brazil work . . . every tribunal is
Brazilian.”212 This raised the question of whether counsel from
developing states reliably experienced having tribunals with multiple
developing world arbitrators. Regardless development status, there
was always a significant and large statistical effect between a
subject’s development status and experience on tribunals containing
multiple developing world arbitrators.
First, using a t-test to assess a binary variable, we identified a
reliable link between mean subject response and OECD status
(t(365)=9.445; p<.001; r=.44; n=367). The direction was such that
non-OECD counsel were more likely to have experienced tribunals
with multiple developing world arbitrators. In contrast, counsel from
OECD states were less likely to have experienced tribunals with
multiple developing world arbitrators.
Second, using an independent groups ANOVA to analyze the
multiple-category variable, there was a reliable relationship between
mean subject response and World Bank Status (F(2,364)=52.360;
p<.001; r=.48; n=367).213 Follow-up analyses using conservative and
liberal tests revealed that both upper-middle or lower-middle income
subjects were both more likely to advocate before tribunals with
multiple developing world arbitrators than high income subjects.
There was, however, no meaningful difference in how frequently
upper-middle and lower-middle income counsel had tribunals with
developing world arbitrators.
Third, using a correlation coefficient to assess the two
continuous variables, there was a reliable link between subject’s HDI
212. Subject number 381 made this comment.
213. Follow-up analyses using both conservative and liberal measures reflected that all
sub-comparisons were significant save one.
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status and experience with diverse tribunals HDI (r(367)=-.42;
p<.001). Like the other tests, where counsel were from less
developed states, they were more likely to have worked with
tribunals containing multiple arbitrators from developing countries;
and the greater the development levels of counsel’s country of origin,
the less likely they were to have experienced tribunals from
developing states.
The results were uniformly significant and all bordered on
statistically large effects. These findings may begin to explain why
developing world arbitrators perceived less of a diversity problem in
international arbitration. If the actual experience of developing world
arbitrators reflects that they are more likely to have worked with
several tribunals composed of primarily developing world arbitrators,
one could infer that subjects would be less likely to identify a
problem with diversity. By contrast, where developed world
arbitrators were not experiencing a caseload with arbitrators from a
broad cross-section of arbitrators with various arbitrators from states
across a developmental divide, they might identify an imbalance
related to nationality or development.
VI. DISCUSSION
The results of the data indicate that there were non-trivial
issues related to diversity in international arbitration related to age,
gender, and nationality. The international arbitration community
should explore what factors contribute to the backgrounds of the
current arbitration bench and bar. Focusing on these aspects, and the
factors contributing to those demographics, provides an opportunity
to explore what inhibits the full utilization of untapped talent to
permit broader systemic value and avoid waste of human capital.
There are several systemic benefits to such an undertaking.
First, taking diversity issues seriously offers an opportunity to
strengthen and create infrastructure for international arbitration’s
future. As the core group of international arbitrators (and counsel)
continues to age, it is worthwhile investing in a new generation of
arbitrators and counsel to ensure that know-how and capacity is not
lost over time. Efforts and mentoring programs, such as Young
ICCA and other groups focused on developing the next generation of
the arbitration community, offer constructive solutions to address this
gap. Bringing younger individuals into the fold increases diversity
and the breadth of ideas and experiences, and could benefit the
community as a whole.
The benefits of diversity go beyond age. The parties involved
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in dispute settlement, who control the appointment of lawyers and
often exercise choice in the appointment of arbitrators, may benefit
from the diversity. Shareholders and boards focusing on diversity,
for example, may wish to use their choice of counsel and arbitrators
to showcase their commitment to diversity. Similarly, state parties
involved in international arbitration might have transparency
requirements requiring them to comply with equal opportunity or
diversity obligations. Moreover, parties may not always identify
with, feel fully heard by, or be able to communicate in a manner that
is fully forthright with lawyers within the international arbitration
community; this, in turn, suggests arbitration services might be
enhanced through expanded market competition.
Second, exploring diversity levels and identifying methods
for enhancing diversity could serve to enhance legitimacy, public
trust, and procedural justice.214
When considering long-term
efficacy, the international arbitration community could benefit from
exploring how to maintain and develop reservoirs of goodwill during
a time of global economic transition. One strategic way of enhancing
legitimacy is to have appropriate and balanced representation before
courts and tribunals, international or domestic. Where adjudication is
“representative of the people, [it] will be considered more legitimate,
and can count on greater trust and confidence from the public at
large.
Conversely, lack of diversity in [adjudication] could
undermine public confidence . . . .”215 The former Chief Judge of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Deanell
Tacha, notes that, “diversity is about bringing together collective
knowledge, born from an array of experiences, in order to ensure the
judiciary and its decisions are respected and followed.”216 These
concerns translate to the international context, whether international
214. See generally THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
INSTITUTIONS (1998); THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS
(1990) [hereinafter FRANCK, THE POWER]; Charles H. Brower II, Structure, Legitimacy and
NAFTA’s Investment Chapter, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 37 (2003). While beyond the
scope of our analysis, we observe that political scientists often link legitimacy to the
“‘reservoir’ of good will” on which institutions rely in the short term to address unpopular
decisions as well as long-term deep-seated support. Scherer, supra note 140, at 625; see also
DAVID EASTON, A FRAMEWORK FOR POLITICAL ANALYSIS 124–26 (1965); Gregory A.
Caldiera & James L. Gibson, The Etiology of Public Support for the Supreme Court, 36 AM.
J. POL. SCI. 635, 636–37 (1992).
215. Kalantry, supra note 147, at 87.
216. Deanell Tacha, Diversity in the Judiciary: A Conversation with Deanell Tacha, 59
U. KAN. L. REV. 1037, 1038 (2011); see also Kalantry, supra note 147, at 88. (“there must be
gender parity in the judiciary to further equality of opportunity for all people, enhance
courts’ legitimacy and strengthen the rule of law.”).
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courts and tribunals217 or international arbitration.218 As Chiara
Giorgetti explains, an “important measure that can be taken to
strengthen the international arbitration system is to enlarge the pool
of arbitrators. More arbitrators from outside Europe and North
America, and more women, are needed.”219 Observing that it “is
widely accepted both at domestic and international levels that ‘a
diverse judiciary is an indispensable requirement of any
democracy,’”220 Giorgetti argues that in a transnational setting with
global economic implications like international arbitration, broad
representation is even more important.221 International arbitration
could therefore benefit from enhanced legitimacy and procedural
justice by having adjudicators who reflect the society to whom they
are responsible. Particularly for ITA, which involves policy matters,
it is critical to both do and be seen to do justice.222 Given the value
of symbolic legitimacy,223 there is untapped value in having an
217. See Grossman, Sex on the Bench, supra note 112; Grossman, Legitimacy and
International Adjudicative Bodies, supra note 121; Grossman, The Normative Legitimacy of
International Courts, supra note 122; Kumar & Rose, supra note 60.
218. Jan Paulsson has also observed that, “[a]rbitration obviously cannot endure if those
asked to consent to its authority are mystified and disaffected. The process will be rejected
if it is perceived that while the arbitrants come from the four corners of the world, rights of
advocacy and the power to decide are reserved to mandarins or high priests operating in a
few dominant cities.” Jan Paulsson, The Alexander Lecture at the Chartered Institute of
Arbitrators: Universal Arbitration—What We Gain, What We Lose (Nov. 29, 2012),
(transcript available at http://www.globalarbitrationreview.com/cdn/files/gar/articles/
jan_Paulsson_Universal_Arbitration_-_what_we_gain_what_we_lose.pdf).
219. Giorgetti, supra note 159, at 480−81.
220. Id. at 481 (citing Centre for Int’l Cts. & Tribunals, Selecting International Judges:
Principle, Process and Politics 37, UNIV. COLL. LONDON DISCUSSION PAPER, available at
http://www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/cict/docs/Selecting_Int_Judges.pdf (quoting Lady Hale, The
Appointment and Removal of Judges:
Independence and Diversity, International
Association of Women Judges 8th Biennial Conference (May 3–7, 2006)) (last visited May
16, 2015).
221. Tom Tyler’s research reflects that enhanced levels of procedural justice are more
likely to generate voluntary compliance with the law, even when a judicial decision is
adverse. See, e.g., TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (2006); Tom R. Tyler,
Procedural Justice, Legitimacy and the Effective Rule of Law, 30 CRIME & JUST. 283 (2003).
222. See Libananco Holdings Co. Ltd. v. Republic of Turk., ICSID Case No. ARB/06/8,
Decision on Preliminary Issues, ¶ 79 (Jun. 23, 2008), available at http://www.italaw.com/
sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0465.pdf (“The Tribunal recalls the well-known saying,
very frequently repeated in legal discussion, that it is not enough that justice should be done,
it must also manifestly be seen to be done.”).
223. See generally FRANCK, THE POWER, supra note 214, at 91–101 (discussing how
symbolic validation impacts legitimacy); Daniel Bodansky, The Legitimacy of International
Governance: A Coming Challenge for International Environmental Law?, 93 AM. J. INT’L
L. 596; Grossman, Legitimacy and International Adjudicative Bodies, supra note 122, at
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inclusive group of international adjudicators that provides expressive,
representational and modeling functions.
Third, although more speculative, it is possible that greater
diversity could facilitate distributive justice and higher quality
outcomes. Having greater representation of different perspectives
during deliberation could aid a more comprehensive appreciation of
parties’ positions and underlying evidence. This, in turn, could
generate higher quality awards.224 There is, however, difficulty in
demonstrating that appointing non-median arbitrators creates
different outcomes—or that different types of diversity will generate
specific effects on the process or the outcome.225
Generating diversity, however, could prove challenging as
international arbitration permits parties to directly control two
arbitrator appointments (and potentially the appointment of the chair,
as well). Parties have incentives to select arbitrators that either
maximize the likelihood of their preferred result in a given case or
minimize the possibility of a negative result. Likewise, parties may
wish to appoint known-qualities in their arbitration counsel and
arbitrators and thereby decrease the risks outcomes generated by
untested arbitrators. These incentives place new international
arbitrators at a disadvantage, which minority status may
exacerbate.226 Nevertheless, boards of directors or other entities
could create pressure to foster diversity in their use of lawyers and
arbitrators,227 or there may be natural incentives to appoint more
116.
224. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
225. For example, in the context of ITA, research suggests that presence of tribunals
with presiding arbitrators from developing countries may not affect outcome or potentially
be linked to developing country arbitrators finding against developing states; the data has
been unable to find that tribunals containing women were reliably different in terms of
outcomes. Franck, Development and Outcomes, supra note 28; see FRANCK, supra note 29.
The results, however, may also reflect the small proportions of female arbitrators and
arbitrators from developing countries. It is possible that, as the population expands, that
there may be a meaningful link with arbitration outcomes.
226. See, e.g., Ilhung Lee, Practice and Predicament: The Nationality of the
International Arbitrator, 31 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 603 (2007) (providing results of how party
appointment attitudes varied in ICA depending upon arbitrators’ nationalities or the
nationalities of their spouses).
227. See, e.g., Andrew Bruck & Andrew Canter, Supply, Demand, and the Changing
Economics of Large Firms, 60 STAN. L. REV. 2087, 2112 (2008) (discussing initiatives by the
Minority Corporate Counsel Association to promote diversity in legal hiring and observing
how after Rick Palmore, Sara Lee’s general counsel, circulated a petition for companies to
terminate relationships with law firms failing to promote diversity, “[s]tories began
circulating, many of them apocryphal, about general counsels dumping some of the nation’s
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broadly.228 Where such incentives do not exist, arbitral institutions
such as ICSID, the LCIA, the ICC, or the Permanent Court of
Arbitration at The Hague can generate increased diversity by
strategically utilizing those appointments they control. Initial
analyses exploring ITA cases reflected that chair appointments by
institutions like ICSID exhibited greater diversity (in terms of
development status) as compared to appointments made by coarbitrators.229 This suggests that stakeholders may wish to follow
institutions’ lead in promoting greater diversity in international
arbitration.
Comparatively, many national courts have arguably done
better at promoting gender equity than international arbitration.
Quantitative analyses on the prevalence of women and developing
world lawyers in international courts and tribunals indicate that
international arbitration is roughly equivalent but certainly not
worse.230 Yet, this is arguably not the appropriate basis for
comparing international arbitration, and the better frame of reference
is to compare international arbitration to other international courts
and tribunals that also exhibit low diversity levels. Two critical
questions are therefore worthy of consideration by the international
arbitration community. First, what is the appropriate yardstick
against which to measure diversity levels in international arbitration?
Second, does international arbitration wish to be a leader or a laggard
in promoting diversity in international law? Given the potential
effect of diversity imbalances on perceived legitimacy, the
international arbitration community should consider taking the lead
in educating stakeholders about the value of diversity in international
adjudication. Diversity can be a function of market forces as parties
to a dispute typically hold the power in obtaining counsel and
appointing arbitrators. With an increasing focus in both the public
and private spheres on gender and other forms of diversity, there is
minimal harm in educating stakeholders about the benefits for them

most prestigious law firms over diversity issues”).
228. See, e.g., Michele DeStefano, Nonlawyers Influencing Lawyers: Too Many Cooks
in the Kitchen or Stone Soup?, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2791, 2803 (2012) (“[S]enior in-house
attorneys insist on diverse teams from their outsourcers. Senior managers also insist on
diverse teams internally. This is because, as a senior legal counselor of a large, publicly
traded corporation contended, ‘combining a broad range of backgrounds and experiences—
in our outside counsel, in our in-house legal team and in our greater work force—leads to the
development of creative strategies and sophisticated ideas.’”) (footnotes omitted).
229. FRANCK, supra note 29.
230. There were also similar patterns in some data related to large law firms. See supra
notes 176–77 and accompanying text.
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to opt for balance. Arbitral institutions with the capacity to appoint
arbitrators should also be conscious of the value of promoting
diversity without sacrificing quality.
Given the enforcement regime available to international
arbitration awards, it is in the long-term interest of the international
arbitration community to redress areas of concern to promote its
longevity and legitimacy. As Salim Moollan observed:
on the one hand, the formal discourse repeated at
every conference we go to emphasizing the
inclusiveness of international arbitration, and, on the
other hand, the perception of our field, in the
developing world as predominantly Euro- and
American-centric. This gives rise to a risk of
arbitration being perceived as foreign process imposed
from abroad, as an unwanted but inevitable corollary
of trade and investment flows.231
He further explained that the conceptual premise of holding an ICCA
Congress in Mauritius:
is that the answer to this is to make sure that the
developing world has its say in the process and in its
development and for international arbitration to
progressively to become part and parcel of the legal
culture of developing countries.
The aim is
accordingly to create a platform run for the benefit of
the region as a whole to build capacity in the field of
international dispute resolution so that, within a
generation Africa can draw on the expertise of
specialist African arbitrators and lawyers.232
Ultimately, the data reflect that diversity issues in
international arbitration are complex and not subject to a uniform
narrative. Nevertheless, the data shed light on the core demographics
of international arbitration and raise questions about the way to
improve diversity and enhance its legitimacy.
International
arbitration could benefit from an identification of those factors that
generate barriers and the consideration of structural and incremental
solutions to address concerns and generate a sustainable international
arbitration system for the future.

231. Moollan, supra note 52, at 2:13–2:40.
232. Id. at 2:41–3:16.
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VII. LIMITATIONS
It is important to identify research limitations to prevent
consumers of scientific research from drawing unwarranted
inferences and to aid assessment of the research’s value. Throughout
this Article, we have included cautions (in the primary text and in
footnotes) about the limitations of survey questions generally and our
questions specifically, the limitations of statistical tests, and the
limitations of the analyzed sample. We identified concerns related to
sample representativeness, the risk of selection effects that derive
from to the potential over-inclusion of North American subjects, the
under-inclusion of other subjects, the use of English language in an
international dispute settlement conference, the potential focus on
elite players rather than newer entrants, and fiscal cost of attendance.
Beyond traditional caveats about drawing inferences from scientific
research,233 it is appropriate to highlight other issues.
First, as ICCA participants had the option to not attend the
initial plenary and also not complete the survey, there is a risk of a
self-selection bias that may limit inferences. Only fifty-five percent
of ICCA registrants attended the first plenary. This means, although
the response rate was reasonable, a number of conference participants
were not represented in the survey results. Similarly, although
distributing surveys at elite conferences may improve response rates,
the method also necessarily limits the sample to those arbitration
practitioners interested in the conference, willing to attend, and able
to attend.234
Second, as the survey involved self-reporting, there is a risk
of error. The error might take the form of misremembered
information. For example, while subjects might identify whether
they had served as counsel or arbitrator, subjects’ memory may not
accurately reflect the precise number of cases. Similarly, subjects
may intentionally misreport to inject error into their responses.
Finally, self-reporting may generate error related to a self-serving
bias should subjects answer in what they deem to be a socially
desirable manner or are otherwise overly optimistic.235
Third, there is a risk of external validity over time. The data
233. Franck et al., supra note 102, at 885–99.
234. See Cheng, supra note 35, at 1279 (identifying similar concerns in distributing
surveys to judges at judicial conferences).
235. TALI SHAROT, THE OPTIMISM BIAS: A TOUR OF THE IRRATIONALLY POSITIVE BRAIN
16–18 (2011); see Emily Pronin, et al., Objectivity in the Eye of the Beholder: Divergent
Perceptions in Self Versus Others, 111 PSYCHOL. REV. 781 (2004).
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from ICCA are now a historical snapshot. It is possible that several
of the findings will change over time. Certain findings related to
diversity might change over time as the group of arbitrators expands.
Future research should reassess these aspects periodically with more
sophisticated measures and models. In this way, we can reconsider
what we know now as we add to our knowledge over time.236
Fourth, for those instances where we conducted tests to look
for group differences and obtained non-significant results, it is not
possible to claim there is no relationship. As discussed, even with a
base sample of over 500 subjects, the effect sizes were so small that
some tests were technically underpowered.237 Future research with
an expanded sample size is required before reaching definitive
conclusions about the lack of a statistically reliable effect. For many
of the non-significant results, the effect sizes were small or less than
small suggesting that any latent differences may not be practically
meaningful; and a sample with sufficient power to detect even the
small effects will require between 1,200-1,600 subjects. A wellattended future ICCA Congress or similar event where there is a
transnational and critical mass of arbitration specialists would be an
appropriate venue for such an undertaking.
More research is required to create the sufficient power,
stability, statistical control, and enhanced validity necessary to reach
more definitive conclusions. Given the practical challenges in
obtaining a sufficiently large set of subjects, it may be challenging to
recreate this research. Those challenges do not diminish the value of
future research providing replication that confirms—and expands—
upon existing research.
CONCLUSION
The data reflect that the modern “invisible college” of
international arbitration is complex and not subject to a flat, unitary
narrative. An appreciation of the nuance and complexity creates a
powerful opportunity. The data can aid the international arbitration
community’s exploration of evidence-based solutions to identifiable
challenges rather than reliance on unrepresentative anecdotes.238
236. See Franck et al., supra note 102, at 888–89, 900–02.
237. See supra notes 190, 211 and accompanying text.
238. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Evidence-Based Law, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 901 (2011)
(exploring opportunities for evidence-based law); see also David L. Sackett et al., Evidence
Based Medicine: What It Is and What It Isn’t, 312 BRIT. MED. J. 71 (1996) (discussing
evidence-based approaches to the practice of medicine).
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The demographics of key actors in international arbitration
reflected bright spots but likewise reflected areas for improvement.
International arbitration has moved past historic Cold War divides.
The data demonstrated that arbitrators and counsel comprised a broad
spectrum of nationalities, continents, and languages. Nevertheless,
the data reflected disproportionate levels of representation by men
from states in North America and Europe, which have high levels of
economic development. Only 24% of counsel and 17.6% of
arbitrators were women.239 Meanwhile, 68.6% of counsel and 76%
of arbitrators were from Europe and North America; 75.2% of
counsel and 82.4% of arbitrators were from OECD states, and 76.5%
of counsel and 84.8% of arbitrators were from high-income
countries. The data supported claims that international arbitration is
a “white male game.”240
Diversity challenges within international arbitration are some
of the most challenging, but also the most rewarding, as they
generate an opportunity for arbitration to take a leadership role within
the broader community of international courts and tribunals. More
than 75% of ICCA subjects identified that they agreed (either
somewhat or strongly) with the proposition that international
arbitration experiences diversity challenges. Yet, the data reflected
heterogeneities in perceived challenges. Women and younger
subjects were more likely to identify diversity challenges than men or
older subjects. Subjects from developing countries (no matter how
defined) were less likely than their developed world counterparts to
identify diversity challenges. These perceived experiences, however,
were juxtaposed with actual experiences related to gender and
development status.
The data also reflected that becoming an international
arbitrator can be challenging, and the proportion of women
arbitrators was only 17.6%. Once women broke the “glass ceiling,”
statistical tests could not identify a meaningful difference in the
number of appointments that women obtained as compared to men.
Yet, roughly one-third of arbitrators had never sat on a tribunal with

239. There was some evidence that, for the subset of arbitrators, the ICCA respondents
had a disproportionately large number of women arbitrators. See supra note 132 and
accompanying text.
240. Peter F. Phillips, ADR Continental Drift: It Remains a White, Male Game, NAT’L
L.J., Nov. 27, 2006, available at http://www.businessconflictmanagement.com/pdf/
BCMpress_08.pdf; Maria R. Volpe et al., Barriers to Participation: Challenges Faced by
Members of Underrepresented Racial and Ethnic Groups in Entering, Remaining, and
Advancing in the ADR Field, 35 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 119 (2008).
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a woman, and more than 75% of counsel reported they had never had
a tribunal with multiple female arbitrators.
Analyzing the development status of international arbitration
specialists also reflected diversity was complex. Recognizing that
developing world arbitrators were less likely to identify diversity
problems in international arbitration, two aspects were noteworthy.
The first was the demographic data reflecting that OECD and/or
high-income arbitrators made up more than 75% of the arbitrators in
our sample. The second was, irrespective of how development status
was defined, developing world arbitrators experienced statistically
lower numbers of appointments than their developed world
colleagues. Even counting developing world arbitrators’ own
appointments, approximately 40% of arbitrators reported never
having sat on a tribunal with a developing world arbitrator; and
59.4% of counsel reported never having worked with a tribunal
containing multiple arbitrators from developing countries. Those
findings must be contextualized against tests demonstrating that
counsel from developing countries were much more likely to
experience tribunals comprised of developing world arbitrators.
There is an important normative question about what is the
appropriate baseline against which diversity in international
arbitration should be evaluated. On the one hand, one might look to
baselines established by national legislatures and judiciaries. On the
other hand, given the transnational nature of international arbitration,
perhaps the baseline offered by public international law is most
appropriate. Using either baseline, the small size of the pool of
women and developing world arbitrators was noteworthy. As
suggested by Sundaresh Menon241 and Salim Moollan,242 discussions
about diversity are worthwhile and may enhance arbitration’s longterm legitimacy and sustainability. In a time when there is a broad
pool of talent in international arbitration, and that talent extends
across national borders243 and encompasses both genders, there is
untapped value in diversifying the pool of arbitrators.
241. See Menon, supra note 126, ¶¶ 74–76 (observing that the international arbitration
community should take into account the unique circumstances of developing nations and
make an effort to engage developing countries into the development of norms); see also
Menon, Where We Have Been, supra note 126, at 1035 (“I believe that this is the essential
challenge of this age–we are moving very rapidly from a time when the key players knew
one another; when they often looked similar and spoke similarly; and when they had a
common legal, cultural and social background; to a period in which there is unprecedented
growth in numbers and in diversity.”).
242. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
243. See LOBEL, supra note 98; Law, supra note 98, at 1323–30.
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There may also be pragmatic reasons to consider how best to
diversify the “invisible college” of arbitrators. First, as international
business activity becomes more complex and international arbitration
expands, it is critical to have a pool of arbitrators who are available to
resolve disputes and appreciate the unique context from which the
dispute arises. This minimizes risk of delay, decreases costs and
increases stakeholder satisfaction. Second, as the existing pool of
international arbitrators continues to age, it is necessary to ensure
institutional and historical knowledge is transferred to the next
generation. The objective should be to prevent an over-concentration
of arbitration experience, so that a broad pool of arbitrators can
continue to offer quality adjudicative services in the future. Third, to
the extent that conflicts of interests within law firms or subject-matter
conflicts of interest limit the services that arbitrators can provide, it is
necessary to have both breadth and depth in the pool of potential
appointees. Finally, as more countries’ economies grow, the demand
for international legal services may increase and generate new
opportunities for individuals in developing world legal systems.
The results provided in this Article are designed to elucidate
the “invisible college” of international arbitrators and identify the tip
of a larger empirical iceberg. We applaud ICCA for taking the first
step in generating transparent information about international
arbitration. In light of the data, we offer some suggestions. First, we
encourage researchers to continue exploring how to generate
scientifically rigorous data that can inform stakeholders and permit
reasoned discussions about how best to improve international
arbitration. Second, given the self-awareness of diversity concerns, it
would be constructive to explore factors creating impediments to
maximizing untapped arbitration talent.
Third, it could be
constructive to identify opportunities for the diversification and
capacity building of counsel and arbitrators that neither sacrifice
quality nor unduly burden party autonomy. We hope this Article
offers a constructive basis for a dialogue about evidence-driven
approaches to enhance the legitimacy of international arbitration and
promote viable systems of dispute settlement for the future.

506

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[53:429

ANNEX 1: RELEVANT SURVEY MATERIALS
Demographic Questions
Your Sex (Male or Female):
Your Nationality (or Nationalities):
Your Current Age:
Your Mother Tongue:
Please identify other languages that you speak and/or write proficiently:
Please indicate jurisdiction(s) where you received your legal education:
☐ Common Law ☐ Civil Law ☐ Both
Please indicate the number of cases where you have acted as:
Counsel in international arbitration:
Expert in international arbitration:
Arbitrator in an international commercial arbitration:
Arbitrator in an international investment treaty arbitration:
Adjudicator in a public international law dispute (International Court
of Justice, World Trade Organization proceedings, etc.):
Judge in a national court proceeding:
ICCA Questions
International arbitration has diversity challenges related to gender,
nationality, or age. [1 (Strongly Disagree) to 5 (Strongly Agree)]
In my experience as arbitrator, I have sat with a/another woman: [More
than 10 times; 6-10 times; 1-5 times; Never]
In my experience as arbitrator, I have sat with an arbitrator from a
developing country: [More than 10 times; 6-10 times; 1-5 times; Never]
In my experience as arbitrator, I have sat with more than one arbitrator from
a developing country: [More than 10 times; 6-10 times; 1-5 times; Never]
In my experience as counsel, I have had an arbitral tribunal that has
multiple women: [More than 10 times; 6-10 times; 1-5 times; Never]
In my experience as counsel, I have had a arbitral tribunal with multiple
arbitrators from developing countries: [More than 10 times; 6-10 times; 1-5
times; Never]

